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fronting practical problems in context, 3 particularly in the field of
criminal litigation where a defendant's personal liberty is at stake and
constitutional protections for the accused are paramount to the truth
4
finding function of the courts.
Like Freedman, my goal in this Article is to discuss three difficult
ethical problems confronted in criminal practice. But unlike Freedman, I intend to address these controversies from the perspective of
the criminal prosecutor. Specifically, when is it proper for a prosecutor to offer charging or sentencing concessions to an accomplice in
order to secure the accomplice's testimony against a codefendant?
When, if ever, may a prosecutor impeach a defense witness who the
prosecutor believes has testified truthfully, and how should this crossexamination be conducted? And finally, how should a prosecutor react at trial when opposing counsel appears to be advocating ineffectively on behalf of his client?
These three quandaries are particularly challenging for prosecutors, for at least two reasons. First, neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor the American Bar Association's StandardsRelating
to the Administration of CriminalJusticeprovide meaningful guidance on
these questions. Moreover, the resolution of these issues is highly dependent both on the specific factual context in which the questions
arise and the prosecutor's resolution of a variety of competing tensions at play in the particular case. Nonetheless, I will argue that these
dilemmas are indeed questions of ethics, and that ethical reasoning
can help guide us to a solution. This brings me to a second goal of
the Article, which is to discuss how the philosophy of virtue ethics may
help us think about difficult questions of professional responsibility
for public prosecutors.
The three questions I will address in this Article fall squarely
within the interstices of professional regulation of lawyers. Model
Rule 3.8 (entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor") does not
purport to answer any of them.5 As one commentator has lamented,
Model Rule 3.8 "barely scratch[es] the surface" 6 of a prosecutor's
unique responsibilities. 7 Buried within the comments to this rule,
3 Id. at 1470; see id. at 1484 ("11t is precisely when one tries to act on abstract
ethical advice that the practicalities intrude, often rendering unethical the well-intended act.").
4 Id. at 1471, 1482.
5 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004).
6 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FoRDHrAM URIA. L.J.
607, 616 (1999).
7 Model Rule 3.8 contains proscriptions relating to pre-trial conduct, the threshold for commencing criminal charges, and publicity. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
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elusive and difficult concept. 1 3 "[W]hat prosecutor doesn't think
that he or she is 'seeking justice' . . . ?"14 Justice might mean several
overlapping but different things simultaneously; for example, it might
mean safeguarding the substantive and procedural rights of the accused, 15 exhibiting general "fairness" to others (including not only
the defendant but also the victim and other witnesses), " showing consistency in decisionmaking,1 7 or promoting public safety.18 This admonition does not provide prosecutors with any real guidance on how
to act in particularly complex areas. At best, "ilts vagueness leaves
prosecutors with only their individual sense of morality to determine
just conduct."19 At worst, it allows prosecutors to rationalize any response to an ethical dilemma by arguing that their chosen conduct
increases the likelihood of conviction and incarceration of a guilty
person.
In light of the amorphous "seek justice" standard, there have
been a number of proposals put forth by commentators to better
channel prosecutorial discretion. Bruce Green has argued that Model
Rule 3.8 needs to be expanded to reach more discretionary decisionmaking by prosecutors. 20 He and Fred Zacharias have also argued
that prosecutors' offices across the country need to articulate and
publicize office policies and principles of decisionmaking to guide the
discretion of individual attorneys. 21 The late Richard Uviller has suggested that functions within the prosecutor's office should be split between quasi-judicial functions (investigation, case evaluation, and plea
bargaining) and adversarial functions (litigation) in order to ensure
that the pressures of the adversarial process do not corrupt the inde-

13 Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL
ErIcs 355, 379 (2001).
14

Id. at 378.

15

Fisher, supra note 12, at 236-37.

16 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111-14 (1971)
fairness towards others).

(equating justice with

17 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 158 (1961) (equatingjustice with treating like cases alike).

18

For a utilitarian theory ofjustice focusing on maximizing the common good,

see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 242-64 (George Sher ed., 2001).

19 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuringthe Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VA-ND. L. REv. 45, 48 (1991).
20 See Bruce A. Green, ProsecutorialEthics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1590;
Green, supra note 6, at 616.

21 Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv.
837, 897.
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pendence of a prosecutor's judgment.2 2 Both Stanley Fisher and Leslie Griffin have argued in favor of better training and closer
23
supervision of prosecutors.
My point in this Article is not to quibble with any of these recommendations; all of them have merit, and, with the exception of the call
for stronger rules,2 4 many of them are now being implemented in
prosecutors' offices across this country. 25 My point is that in a largely
discretionary system, none of these suggestions-taken either alone or
collectively-will insulate criminal defendants from the potentially ruinous decisions of overzealous prosecutors. The scholarly discourse
about prosecutorial ethics to date has been missing an important element-a focus on the characterof individual prosecutors making discretionary decisions.
Following the Clinton impeachment there has been a rising national debate about the character of our country's leaders. 2 6 This debate has rekindled interest in what kind of people we want our public
officials to be. 27 To date, however, the public discourse on the subject
of character has greatly outpaced the scholarly literature. While legal
ethicists such as Thomas Shaffer and Reed Loder have examined issues of professional responsibility through the lens of virtue ethics, 2 8
22 See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
PassionatePursuit, 68 FoRDXtuAM L. REV. 1695, 1716 (2000).
23 See Fisher, supra note 12, at 257; Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14
GEO. J. LUc.A ETics 259, 262 (2001).
24 In the 2002 amendments to the Model Rules, the ABA affirmatively decided to
"leave questions of prosecutorial conduct for another day," partly because it anticipated strenuous objections from the Department of Justice, and partly because the
Ethics 2000 Commission contained no members currently serving as prosecutors.
Bruce A. Green, ProsecutingMeans More Than Locking Up Bad Guys, LITIG., Fall 2005, at
12, 16.
25 See, e.g., Panel Discussion, CriminalDiscovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv.
781, 794-95 (1999) (comments of Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill) (discussing training programs in effect at many prosecutors' offices with respect to discovery); Ronald F.
Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 1010, 1023-24 (2005) (discussing Washington state prosecutorial
guidelines for charging and plea bargaining); cf TEX. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
309 (a) (2005) (broadening Model Rule 3.8 by prohibiting prosecutor from threatening
criminal charges without probable cause).
26 See Kenneth L. Woodward, What is Virtue, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1994, at 38, 38.
27 Gary Watson, On the Primacy of Character,in IDENTrrv, CHARACTER, AND MoRA1
rry 449, 462 (Owen Flanagan & Amslie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990) (citing a "renewal of interest" in the ethics of virtue).
28 See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
Rnv. 841,841-42 (2002) ("Virtue and character, subjects long out of fashion in moral
philosophy and even ordinary life, have enjoyed a rather sparkling revival despite the
longstanding preoccupation in ethics with principles to guide action."); Thomas L.
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there has been little scholarly discussion of how this field of philosophy might inform our understanding of prosecutorial discretion.
Prosecutors are leaders in our criminal justice system who wield a
great deal of power to affect the day-to-day lives of our citizens. It is
past time we devote serious attention to the character of the individuals making these important decisions.
Beginning with the ethics of Aristotle and building on the work
of modern philosophers such as Alasdair Maclntyre2 9 and Bernard
Williams,"0 I intend in this Article to examine the virtues expected of a
public prosecutor. After a brief review of virtue ethics and its contribution to moral reasoning, I will analyze each of the three "hard"
questions of prosecutorial ethics I posed above. In each of these situations, how would a virtuous prosecutor approach the problem? How
might a focus on virtue (and particularly the Aristotelian virtues of
courage, fairness, honesty, and prudence) contribute to the analysis of
these three ethical dilemmas?
Any attempt to regulate how prosecutors should "act" in certain
highly contextualized and nuanced situations by developing more specific normative rules is unworkable. Prosecutorial discretion would be
better constrained in these areas by focusing on what type of character
traits prosecutors should possess or strive to acquire. Only after we
answer the critical preliminary question of who we want our public
prosecutors to "be" can we possibly hope to discern what we expect
our prosecutors to "do." In the concluding Part of the Article, I will
demonstrate that a renewed emphasis on character and virtue has direct implications for how prosecutors' offices should be structured
and organized in this country, and how individual prosecutors working within these offices should aspire to conduct their professional
lives.
I.

VIRTUE ETHIcs: ARISTOTLE AND BEYOND

Legal theorists typically distinguish between two types of moral
theories-deontological and consequentialist.3" Deontologists such
as Immanuel Kant posit that we must look to prior principles in order
Shaffer, On Living One Way in Town and Another Way at Home, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 879,
889-90 (1997).

29

See ALASDAIR

MACINTYRE, ArER VIRTUE

6-22 (2d ed. 1984).

30 See BERNARD WILLIAmS, ETHIc-s AND THE LiMrTs OF PHILOSOPHY 1-29 (1985).
31 Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Correctivejustice: A PragmaticJustification
for
Jury Adjudication, 88 Mic". L. REV. 2348, 2395 (1990).
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in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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154, 164-67 (Carl J. Friedrich ed.,
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1993).

SHOULD ONE LIVr?
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1, 7 (Roger Crisp ed., 1996).
STUD. 709,
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714-15 (1995).
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36 Wells, supra note 31, at 2395.
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Morally Required:
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38 See Cass R. Sunstein &
(2005).
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may mistheory is that an individual actor
moral
deontological
of
39 One critique
futile to
be
may
"It
norms reflected in the rules.
construe rules, or may misprioritize
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to rationalize saving his wife from a burning building on background
principles [either deontological (duty) or consequentialist (maximizing happiness and minimizing pain)] he is having "one thought too
many." 40 Values and principles alone cannot determine proper outcomes, because moral judgment is not just about arriving at appropriate answers-or what Gerald Postema facetiously termed "getting our
moral sums right."'41 Moraljudgment is also about nurturing the appropriate attitudes and reactions to the situations in which individuals
find themselves. 42 For these reasons, it is critical to approach
problems of professional ethics from a perspective that recognizes the
43
importance of character.

A focus on character may help to bridge the gap where both deontological and utilitarian reasoning fail. For example, there is an
important difference between "being truthful," which is a good character trait, and "not telling lies," which is a rule. 44 One might violate

the proscription on lying in certain compelling circumstances without
being an untruthful person (e.g., lying about whether Anne Frank
and her family are hiding in your attic in order to protect them from
arrest by the Nazi forces). 45 Deontological reasoning simply fails to
provide meaningful guidance in that situation. Moreover, to be an
theory and actual decision and practice." Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in
ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63, 67 (1980). One critique of utilitarian moral
theory is that it would permit an actor to treat another individual as a means towards
societal ends, rather than an autonomous end in himself. See IMMANUEL KANT, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, in KANT'S

CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON

1, 55-57 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
trans., London: 6th ed., rev, 1898). For example, a purely utilitarian theory of
prosecutorial ethics may permit an actor to encourage police perjury or withhold exculpatory evidence from the accused, if he reasonably believed that such actions
would go undetected and would maximize social welfare by leading to the conviction
of a highly dangerous and guilty defendant.
AND OTHER WORS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS

40

BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Characterand Morality, in MoRAL LUCK 1, 18 (1981).

41 Postema, supra note 39, at 68.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 70.
44 Shaffer, supra note 28, at 890. In discussing the gap between rules of professional responsibility and ethical conduct, Thomas Shaffer has noted that the character Atticus Finch in Harper Lee's novel To Kill a Mockingbirdwas a person who prized
honesty, but was willing to lie to protect vulnerable Boo Radley from certain ruin.
"[Llying to protect Boo Radley is the sort of thing Atticus would do," notwithstanding
that he is an honest man. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in ProfessionalEthics, 10
QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 30 (1984).
45 This hypothetical is reminiscent of Ronald Dworkin's distinction between principles and rules. Rules are absolute. If two rules conflict, one of them is not a valid
rule. Principles have varying degrees of weight and importance, and at times may
conflict with one another. When two principles intersect, in order to resolve the con-
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authentically truthful person one must at times speak honestly, even if
it might cause great pain to others. Cheating on your tax return is
wrong, even where it is necessary to finance a life-saving medical procedure for a family member. In this situation, purely utilitarian forms
of moral reasoning may also fail us. These examples illustrate that if
lawyers are expected to be honest throughout their professional activities, they must be taught to prize the truth, and not simply admon'
46
ished "not to lie."
Virtue ethics is a teleological philosophy rooted in the classical
humanism of Aristotle. 47 The course which a moral agent takes is directed toward a "telos," or goal. 48 But unlike consequentialist theories
such as utilitarianism, where the ultimate goal of human action is
maximizing happiness, the "telos" for a virtue ethicist is individual
human flourishing. 49 The concept of the good is prior to the concept
of the right, but what is good is determined by intrinsic human excel50
lence rather than external outcomes.
Aristotle emphasized the sort of person we must become if we
want to live a good life. 5 1 Virtue is acquired through practice. Repetition of virtuous actions will lead to virtuous character (habit), which
in turn will lead to more virtuous action. Just as men "become builders by building houses," they become just persons by practicing just
flict the actor must take into account the relative weight and purpose of each. See
RONALD DWOR1IN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1978),
46 Rosalind Wursthouse, Normative Virtue Ethics, in How SHOULD ONE LIVE?, supra
note 33, at 19, 27.
47 Although Aristotle's views have been justifiably criticized because his politics
were exclusionary (for example, he did not think that slaves or women-non-members of the polis-could aspire to lead a flourishing life), we do not need to agree
with those particular views in order to take seriously his theories of character, reason,
and human nature. Aristotle's theories reflect the historical and political situation in
ancient Greece, and may certainly be adjusted to fit changing times. See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-OrientedLegal Theory and the Moral Foundation
of DeliberativeDemocracy, 82 CAL. L. Rev. 329, 372-73 (1994); Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Moral Development, and the Virtues, in How SHOULD ONE LrvE?, supra note 33, at
211, 211-16.
48 MAcINTYRE, supra note 29, at 148; see OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY' 22,
362 (Simon Blackburne ed., 2005).
49 MAcINTYRE, supra note 29, at 185; seeJames F. Keenan, Virtue Ethics: Making a
Case as it Comes of Age, 67 THOUGHTr 115, 123 (1992). Aristotle's term "eudaimonea," is
usually translated to mean "happiness," "flourishing," or "becoming an excellent
human being." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETmICS bk. VII, ch. 12-14, at 204-08 (Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford 2002); see WILLIAM J. PRIOR, VIRTUE AND KNOWLEDGE 146,
149 (1991);James W. Perkins, Virtues and the Lauyer, 38 CATH. LAw. 185, 198 (1998).
50 Watson, supra note 27, at 450, 461.
51 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. II, ch. 1, at 111-12.
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actions and self-controlled persons by practicing self control. 2 Only
by putting the virtues into practice does the good become integrated
in our character. 53 An action is right if it is in conformity with the
54
virtues, and improper or unethical if it is contrary to the virtues.
The proper threshold question for virtue ethicists is thus not
"what should one do?" but "what kind of person should one be?"
Only when we answer that question can we possibly hope to discern
what to do. 55 Whereas deontological theories are concerned with uni-

versal principles or rules (what is "right"), virtue ethics is concerned
with the goal of becoming a good person. 56 "[G] oodness conveys the
agent as striving out of love to realize the right."57 For a virtue
ethicist, "how it is best or right or proper to conduct oneself is explained in terms of how it is best for a human being to be."58 Virtue
ethics makes the characteristics of a good person the focus of analysis,
"on the assumption that one who is good is likely to do the right thing
59
in most situations."
It is important to distinguish virtue from two related but distinct
concepts: value and honor. Values are about personal preference (I
might prefer fame to money, leisure time to material goods, or friendship to autonomy). Virtues, on the other hand, are internal dispositions of character or mind that lead to human excellence. 60 The
virtues exert control on our external preferences, but they are both
prior and superior to our value systems.
Virtue is also distinct from honor. Honor is often equated withstatus-the social prestige, accolades, and privilege that come from
having a good reputation. 61 Honor is not a virtue because it depends
on the approval of others-"the gossip of the town and the judgment
52

Id.

53

See

GERMAIN GRISEZ, CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 55 (1983).

54 Watson, supra note 27, at 458.
55 Crisp, supra note 33, at 7.
56 See Robert Araujo, The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigmand Possibility, 50 SMU L. REV.
433, 452 (1997); Keenan, supra note 49, at 120.
57 Keenan, supra note 49, at 121.
58 Watson, supra note 27, at 451.
59 Loder, supra note 28, at 842 n.1.
60 Lawrence B. Solurn, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1365, 1375

(2005).
61

See Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor, in REVIUSIONS: CHANCMORAL PHILOSOPHY 172, 177 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair
MacIntyre eds., 1983) ("The concept of honor implies that identity is essentially, or at
INC

PERSPECTrVES IN

least importantly, linked to institutional roles.").
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of circumstantial elites." 62 We honor others only because they have
done something to merit the honor. 63 Character, by contrast, comes
from within, and is directed at helping us to become our best selves
rather than attaining the approval of others. For Aristotle, honor was
64
at best only a goal secondary to virtue.
Individuals are not born with virtue, but they are born with the
capacity to learn the virtues through nurturing and training. Aristotle
believed that we are not by nature either good or evil, although we
may have tendencies toward one pole or another. 65 During childhood and adolescence we acquire good or bad dispositions through
the process of rewards and discouragement. 6 6 A student of virtue performs virtuous acts, makes them a habit (integration), and then approaches particular situations by combining intellect and character
through the process of practical wisdom, which will be discussed later
in this section. 67 Once moral virtues become habitual dispositions
and are coupled with reason, they allow the individual "to [choose]
freely the just and beautiful action[ ]."68
Aristotle classified the virtues into two distinct categories: the
moral virtues and the intellectual virtues.6 9 The moral virtues are
those virtues that perfect the part of the soul which can be controlled
or influenced by rationality. 70 Aristotle emphasized eleven moral virtues: temperance, courage, industriousness, generosity ("magnanimity"), pride, good temper ("mildness"), truthfulness, friendliness,
modesty,justice, and pleasantness (being "ready witted"). 71 The intellectual virtues, for Aristotle, are those virtues that perfect the part of
the soul which itself reasons, that is, the virtues that shape the capacity
to reason. The five intellectual virtues are understanding (intuition),
science, theoretical wisdom (philosophy), craft (the art of produc72
tion), and practical wisdom.
62

Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18

ST.

MARy's L.J. 195, 248

(1986).
63 MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 116.
64 Id.
65 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. II, ch. 1, at 111-12.
66 SeeJONATHAN JACOBS, ARISTOTLE'S VIRTUES 112 (2004).
67
68
52, 67
69
70

ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 11, at 185-86.
Richard Bodeus, Aristotle, in THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
(Richard W. Popkin ed., 1999).
PRIOR, supra note 49, at 156.
ALASDAMR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 64 (1998).
ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. I, ch. 5-9, at 115-22; id. bk. IV, ch. 3, at 148-51;

71
id. at 307 (table).
72

JACOBS, supra note 66, at 131; see ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 3, at

178-79.
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In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas synthesized Aristotelian philosophy and Christian tradition in his treatise Summa Theo-

logica.73 For Aquinas, virtue is one of the necessary means by which a
person is led to his perfection;7 4 that is, achieving the beatific vision
and coming to know God. 75 Aquinas agreed with Aristotle on what he

termed the "human" virtues (both intellectual and moral) but added
to Aristotle's framework the "theological" virtues of faith, hope, and
charity. 76 Moreover, Aquinas grouped Aristotle's natural virtues into
what he termed the four "cardinal" virtues-prudence, justice, temperance, and courage. 77 Aquinas saw all of Aristotle's other moral virtues as subsumed or grouped within one of these four cardinal
78
virtues.

In a grouping reminiscent of Aquinas, modern virtue ethicist
Alasdair Maclntyre has seized upon justice, courage, and honesty as
the most important virtues for individuals striving to be responsible
moral agents. 79 For the purposes of this Article, I intend to analyze
these three key virtues identified by Maclntyre, in addition to the "cornerstone" Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue of practical wisdom (or
"prudence"). I will discuss what it means for a prosecutor to possess
the virtues of justice, courage, honesty, and prudence. And, in particular, I will examine how these virtues may shape the conduct of a prosecutor confronted by the three hard ethical questions posed at the
beginning of this Article.
73 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1974).
74 Id. pt. I-1I, q. 79, art. 4; id. pt. 1-II, q. 56, art. 1.
75 Id. pt. I-I, q. 3, art. 8.
76 Id. pt. I-I, q. 58, art. 3 at 835; id. pt. 1-I, q. 62, art. 3 at 852-53.
77 Id. pt. 1-11, q. 61, art. 2, at 847.
78 Id. pt. I-1l, q. 61, art. 3, at 847.
79 MAclNTYR, supra note 29, at 191. In After Virtue, Macintyre criticizes as "emotivist" all contemporary moral debates. Id. at 18-22. Maclntyre believes that the assertion that something is the "right thing to do" is nothing more than expression of
approval or disapproval of that conduct. Id. at 19-20. According to MacIntyre, debates between rights and utility, or freedom and equality, can have no rational end
because they rest on different premises of what is good. Id. at 21. Maclntyre believes
that utilitarian and deontological arguments are morally incoherent, and the emotivist picture of the self has no social content because the rationality of judgment lies
in the reasonableness of the starting premise. Id. at 12-15. Maclntyre argues that the
key to leading a virtuous life is intelligibility; we are all authors of our own narratives,
and intelligibility (the reasons for our choices) is the key link between action and the
narrative of our life. Id. at 209. An intelligible narrative account makes sense of one's
decisions. Id. at 209-10. For Maclntyre, the only kind of coherent narrative that links
birth to death is a quest for the good. Id. at 186-91.
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Before I begin the discussion, let me first define the four key virtues that will be the focus of my argument:
Justice. Aristotle identified justice as the "complete virtue," and
spent all of Book V of Nicomachean Ethics discussing what it means to
be a just person.8 0 Aristotle distinguished between universal justicewhich is the complete or perfect virtue ("kratiste") -from particular
justice, which is a moral virtue on par with courage, temperance, etc.8 '
Universal justice is concerned with law abidingness and compliance
with rules.8 2 Particular justice-the context in which I will use the
term throughout this Article-is concerned with right relations to83
wards others.
For Aristotle, particular justice is the virtue by which a person
"lives in right relation with his neighbor. 8' 4 Individuals must recognize each other's existence and their right to co-exist. Justice occurs
where there is reciprocity, that is, where "every person renders to one
another those concerns which each has for the self."8 5 Aristotle believed that justice was closely related to friendship. One can have
friendship for pleasure, for advantage, or for good. The best and
highest form of friendship is a friendship of the third variety. Where
individual A is concerned for individual B for B's own sake, rather
than for the result accruing to A, A essentially recognizes B as another
self.8 6 Justice is the virtue that prompts me to act for the sake of an8 7
other's well being, rather than just my own.
Bernard Williams equated the Aristotelian notion of justice (justice "in the particular") to "fairness." 8 According to Williams, an unjust person is one who is "not ... affected or moved by considerations
of fairness."89 The vice of injustice is seen as "settled indifference" to
others. 90 For the remainder of this Article, I will adopt Bernard Williams's construction of justice as fairness, and use the term "fairness"
80

ARISTOTLE,

81

DAVID O'CONNOR, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY 8

supra note 49, bk. V, at 158-76; PRIoR, supra note 49, at 168.
(1985).

82
83

Id. at 23.
Id.

84

JEAN PORTER, THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE 31-32 (1990); see ARISTOTLE, supranote

49, bk. V, ch. 1, at 158-60.
85 Araujo, supra note 56, at 442.
86
87

See ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VIII, ch. 3, at 210-12.
PRIOR, supra note 49, at 174-75.
88 BERNARD WILLIAMS, fustice as Virtue, in MoRAL LUCK, supra note 40, at 83, 90.
89 Id. Williams disagreed with Aristotle that all injustice was motivated by "pleonexia"-the desire for more for oneself. Id. at 91. Williams thought that injustice
could result from multiple motives, or from no motives at all. Id. at 93.
90 Id. at 93; see also Loder, supra note 28, at 860 (observing that one aspect of
integrity involves "(r] especting other people and having concern for their interests").
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obvious tautology that would reas a synonym for justice to avoid the
of a prosecutor's duty to
sult from attempting to identify the contours
"seek justice" with reference to this cardinal virtue.
an individual to do
Courage. Courage is the virtue that enables
9
or risk to themselves.
danger
harm,
notwithstanding
good
what is
cowardice and false confidence,
For Aristotle it was the mean between
92
saw courage as related to care and
or "boldness." Alasdair MacIntyre
that he cares for some individual,
concern for others: "If someone says
to risk harm or danger on his,
community or cause, but is unwilling
the genuineness of his care
her or its own behalf, he puts in question
of
93 Similarly, Reed Loder has captured the virtue
and concern."
persome
I pressure, even at
courage as the ability to "[w]ithstand(
9 4 With respect to the conduct of public officials, the
sonal sacrifice.
the willingness to sacrifice short
virtue of courage is also implicated in
that is, courage may enable a
term benefits for longer range goals;
a proper balance between the
prosecutor, legislator or judge to "strike
of the public and the long-range
immediate demands and concerns
95
public good."
of being truthful in
Honesty. Aristotle recognized the importance
9 6 For Aristotle, the excess of truthfulness was
speech and action.
was "self deprecation,"
97
boastfulness and the deficiency of truthfulness
these two vices.
between
mean
the
being
with the virtue of honesty
clearly was focusing on truthfulness
In giving these examples, Aristotle
9
assessment. But this virtue also
as important to an individual's self
assessment of external
has important implications for an individual's of honesty as "tolerthe virtue
facts. Thomas Shaffer9 characterized
9 A person is honest if he is comfortable with
ance for ambiguity."
circumstances and other people
incongruity, and is willing to accept
the need to make them confor the way they are, rather than feeling
supra note 49, bk. III, ch. 9, at 137-38.
supra note 29, at 117-18.
92 Id. bk. II, ch. 7, at 118-20; MAcINT'RE,
93 MAcINTYRE, supra note 29, at 192.
94 Loder, supra note 28, at 846.
Ethicsfrom a
Judge Be a Good Politician?Judicial
95 Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good
433, 466 (2005).
Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 Mo. L. REv.
ch. 7, at 155.
IV,
bk.
96 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49,
97 Id. bk. II, ch. 7, at 118-20.
of an individual's internal self assessment,
98 Also focusing on the integrity
vices
and self deception are two specialized
Gabriele Taylor has argued that hypocrisy
authentic
his
about
himself
individual to deceive
of dishonesty, because they allow an
144-47
in THE ARIsTOTELEAN SOCIETY 143,
Integrity,
Taylor,
Gabriele
constitution.
91

ARISTOTLE,

(Supp. LV 1981).
99

Shaffer, supra note 44, at 33.
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sistent with his own predispositions. An honest person is thus open to
evidence that discredits his own ideas or world view.1)0
Prudence. Prudence, or "practical wisdom," is the one intellectual
virtue which Aristotle also considered to be a moral virtue. In fact,
Aristotle treats practical wisdom as the "keystone of all virtue." 0, Ethical judgment ends in action for Aristotle through the process of practical wisdom, or "phronesis."'0 2 For Aristotle, the moral virtues are
those characteristics of the soul that allow us to desire and to select
good ends.1 0 3 But practical wisdom is the virtue that allows us to take
10 4
aim and decide on a course of action to achieve these good ends.
Practical wisdom enables one to act at the time "when one should,"
105
"in the way one should," and "for the reasons one should."
In Aristotle's view, the gap between priority rules and action is
bridged by the virtue of practical wisdom.1 °6 Arriving at the ability to
know and recognize what is good cannot be accomplished without
this intellectual virtue. All choice involves consideration and deliberation of the alternatives. 0 7 Practical wisdom is the ability to deliberate
well-to recognize and perceive proper ends, and then to select those
means that are likely to achieve such ends.108 Deliberation toward any
end is cleverness; deliberation toward a good end is practical
wisdom109

Aristotle recognized that in certain situations the moral virtues
may be in conflict (for example, courage may point in one direction
and temperance in another).1 10 However, Aristotle believed that
practical wisdom was the key to discerning a proper course of action
100 See Loder, supra note 28, at 856.
101 MAcIiRE, supra note 70, at 74.
102 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 5, at 179-80; id. at 455 (word list); see
Solum, supra note 60, at 1385.
103 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 13, at 189.
104 Id. bk. VI, ch. 12, at 187.
105 Id. bk. 1I, ch 6, at 117.
106 Id. bk. VI, ch. 13, at 188.
107 ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, in 2 THiE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1922,
1942 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
108 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 13, at 189; see DANIEL MARK NELSON, THE
PRIORITY OF PRUDENCE 42-43 (1992); PRIOR, supra note 49, at 178.

109 Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, in VIRTUE ETHICS 105, 109 (Stephen Darwall
ed., 2003).
110 Crisp, supra note 33, at 17. St. Thomas Aquinas, unlike Aristotle, believed that
the natural virtues were unified. Id. Alasdair Maclntyre criticizes Aquinas's account
of the unity of the virtues, and suggests that different ethical outcomes are possible
for two virtuous actors. A conflict in virtues does notjust come from defect in character. MAcINTYRE, supra note 29, at 197. It is possible for two virtuous actors to apply
practical wisdom and to come to two different conclusions, although frequently prac-
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in those instances where the virtues might conflict. 1 ' What might be
cowardice in one situation might be courage in another. For Aristotle
' 12
"[t] he virtues of character are unified through practical wisdom."
"Virtuous action cannot be specified without reference to the judgment of a prudent man." 1 13 This emphasis on context is distinctly
Aristotelian.' 14 To be a virtuous person requires "sensitivity to the salient features of [particular] situations," and not merely the capacity to
115
apply or follow explicit rules.
Practical wisdom involves a three-step process-deliberation,
judgment, and decision.1 6 It is a dialectic rather than a purely deductive approach.1 7 Individuals who possess the virtue of practical wisdom are reflective;I" they are willing and able to deliberate well
about what it means to pursue the good in a particular circumtical wisdom will lead them to view competing claims the same way in context. Id. at
200.
111 ARSTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 13, at 189; see also Lorie M. Graham,
Aristotle's Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer, 20J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 15 (1995) (discussing the
need to integrate practical reason to attain complete virtue).
112 JACOBS, supra note 66, at 124.
113

MACINT-vR,

supra note 70, at 66.

114 Aristotle recognized that one person's virtue is not commensurate with another's, and that some people are more capable than others. The degree of the
strength in each one's life "depends on the gifts each one has." Keenan, supra note
49, at 122. Thus "to the extent one strives as best one can, one is good." Id. Each
person may pray for the absolute good to come within his grasp, but what he should
be actively pursuing is the good he can obtain. See Bodeus, supra note 68, at 68.
Modem virtue theorists such as Alasdair Maclntyre and Rosalind Hursthouse use
these parts of Aristotelian theory to support relativistic claims on moral reasoning. See
Rosalind Hursthouse, Normative Virtue Ethics, in How SHouLD ONv LwE?, supra note
33, at 19, 35. Modem virtue ethicists thus admit the possibility of cultural relativismfor example, different cultures have different notions of truthfulness. See Robert
Wachbroit, A Genealogy of Virtues, 92 YALY L.J. 564, 576 (1983). Maclntyre, like Wachbroit, recognized that different societies emphasize different virtues over time. Virtues may vary across traditions, but within traditions virtue theory could lead
individuals to moral right. See MAcINrvrE, supra note 29, at 193 (noting that virtuous
"practices. . .might flourish in societies with very different codes; what they could not
do is flourish in societies in which virtues were not valued").
115 Crisp, supra note 33, at 17. Aristotle did not argue that every moral decision
involves intense intellectual effort and a long period of deliberation. On the contrary, Aristotle believed that a person of the highest level of moral achievement often
could deliberate quickly, because he is able to operate more from habit than
anguished self examination. ARiSTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 9, at 184.
116 Perkins, supra note 49, at 200.
117

Am~lie Oksenberg Rorty, Introduction to EssAys ON ARiSTOTLE's ET-ics 1, 2-3

(Amlie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).
118 Loder, supra note 28, at 854.
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stance. 19 A person who is good at deliberation combines both compassion (the power of generating feelings for potential outcomes,
even those that affect others rather than himself) and detachment
(the power to moderate or confine those feeling in balancing interests
and making decisions between alternatives).1 2 0 The prudent lawyer is
able both to identify the salient features of particular situations, and
then to synthesize the multiplicity of concerns at stake. 12 '
In The Common Law Tradition, Karl Llewellyn argued that a
judge's habits guide his method of interpretation and judicial reasoning.1 22 In assessing what it means to be an impartial jurist, Llewellyn
described the following attitude: "an idea of effort, of self denying labor, toward patience, toward understanding sympathy, toward [a]
quest for wisdom in the result."1 23 This depiction of the judicial
thought process was essentially a celebration of the Aristotelian virtue
of practical wisdom.1 24 In many of their tasks, prosecutors perform
quasi-judicial functions that require them to step out of a purely adversarial role.12 5 That is, in certain areas of decisionmaking we expect
prosecutors-like judges-to be impartial in assessing the propriety of
potential courses of action, and to come to a decision only after careful and balanced deliberation about the public interest. 2 6
How does an emphasis on practical wisdom differ from the socalled "new casuistry" approach to legal ethics? Casuistry has been
defined as a "particularized, context-driven method" of ethical decisionmaking,12 7 whereby one extrapolates from the principles underlying an ethical rule, and then determines the right course of action in
gray areas by giving full consideration to the details of the situation
119 CYNDI BANKS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 235-40 (2004); see also Scott FitzGibbon, Marriageand the Ethics of Office, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 89, 104
(2004) (arguing that choice, consideration, and deliberation can only properly arise
from a self-governing character).
120 ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 74 (1993).
121 In his seminal 1993 book, Anthony Kronman lamented that good judgment is
a trait of character no longer nurtured by the legal profession, either in the way we
educate law students, the way we mentor and develop young lawyers in practice, or
the way we structure and organize law firms. Id. at 165.
122 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 53 (1960).
123 Id. at 47.
124 KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 217.
125 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MoDERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.1, at 759 (1986) (recognizing that the prosecutor's dual role of convicting the guilty and protecting the
innocent "leaves the office much nearer that of a judicial officer than that of partisan
advocate"); Fisher, supra note 12, at 236-38.
126 See Maria Collins Warren, Ethical Prosecution: A Philosophical Field Guide, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 269, 270 (2002).
127 Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 492 (1999).

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:2

128
and the motives and circumstances of the various actors involved.

But as proponents of new casuistry recognize, the proper exercise of
casuistry requires not only attention to and reflection on the particulars of a concrete ethical dilemma, but also a form of expertise. Casuistry is not just going with your best "hunch" or intuition. Those who
are successful at casuistry as a form of moral reasoning are those that
have developed the wisdom necessary to develop considered moral
judgments) 2 9 Casuistry and virtue theory thus share an emphasis on
the importance of practical wisdom and experience. Where casuistry
and virtue theory diverge, however, is on the issue of what personal
attributes of the decisionmaker apart from wisdom (and perhaps the
other intellectual virtues such as the ability to listen attentively and to
reason) are necessary to considered moral judgment. Unlike casuistry, virtue ethics looks inward and emphasizes the importance of the
good characterof the decisionmaker. 1 30 For Aristotle and other virtue
ethicists, a person's character is akin to the muscles of an athlete; successful performance in any particular endeavor depends not only on
attention to the external circumstances of the contest, but also on
conditioning and development of the inner self.
I will now turn to the three ethical questions I posed at the beginning of this Article. A close scrutiny of the context in which such decisions are made can help explain why real life pressures often obscure
a commitment to ethical judgment. In the criminal justice system,
prosecutors must contend with multiple actors with competing claims
in the drama-including the victim, police officers, the defendant,
and other witnesses. The prosecutor must also maintain good working relationships with numerous stakeholders in the system-including the judge, other court personnel, law enforcement agencies, and
informants. Prosecutors face external political pressure from a concerned public and the press, and internal pressures from a boss who is
typically an elected public official. Dynamic pressures within the criminal justice system also affect a prosecutor's ability to do his job properly; daunting workloads and under-funded offices typically allow
128 See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theoly-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical
Education,75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1697-98 (1991) ("Ethical systems emerge from this
network of relationships when we seek to resolve and explain our resolutions of the
quotidian dilemmas that we encounter in the complex, nuanced, temporal context in
which they arise. This ethical theory, then, responds to the experiences central to
daily personal situations and requires reflection on such situations to develop moral
consciousness.").
129 Tremblay, supra note 127, at 522.
130 For a further discussion of the differences between casuistry and virtue ethics,
see infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors little time to make nuanced decisions in particular cases.
Finally, every decision is riddled with epistemological problems; although prosecutors must make factual assessments quickly and constantly, they seldom have all the information needed to make difficult
choices. In light of these myriad tensions and limitations, I will
demonstrate that rules of professional responsibility do not and cannot
direct moral action in any of the three complex areas I will describe.
However, a renewed focus on virtue (and particularly the virtues of
fairness, courage, honesty, and prudence) can provide meaningful
guidance for conscientious prosecutors striving to do what is right.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF THE TURNCOAT ACCOMPLICE

Assistant United States Attorney Thomas Marks is prosecuting three
individuals charged with distributinga large quantity of cocaine (five kilograms) and conspiracy. The defendants were arrested after a so-called "reverse sting" operation, whereby an undercover officer sold five kilograms of
cocaine to the defendants for $75, 000. When one of the defendants handed
the undercover officer the money and took possession of the cocaine, the undercover officer gave the surveillance team a signal, and they moved in to
effectuate the arrests of all three individuals.
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, each defendant is facing a
minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of ten years. Each defendant
played a somewhat different role in the transaction and the negotiations
leading up to the exchange. Defendant #1 appeared to law enforcement to be
the primary ringleader of the enterprise; each of the meetings to discuss the
transactionoccurred at his used car business, and he played the largest role
in negotiatingthe price, quantity, and other terms of the sale. According to
DEA agents and their informants, Defendant #1 is the leader of an organization that moves approximately twenty kilograms of cocaine per month and
then launders the proceeds through the car dealership. Defendant #2 appeared to be another key player in the enterprise, acting as Defendant #I's
lieutenant. During negotiationsfor the sale of cocaine he made several inculpatory statements (captured on tape) indicating his knowledge of the cocaine business and his plans to package and resell the drugs. Defendant #2
has no prior criminal record. Defendant #3 acted primarily as a lookout
during the transaction. The government clearly has enough to convict Defendant #3 of drug trafficking on an accomplice theory (he drove the other
two defendants to the scene of each priormeeting, and on the date of the sale
frisked the undercover officer when he walked into the used car business and
then stood guard by the door). However, the DEA does not think Defendant
#3 was a substantialplayer in the enterprise.
Defendant #1 and Defendant #2 have no prior criminal records. Defendant # 3 has a significant prior record of violent crime-includingconvictions for assaultand battery with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence,
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firearm possession, and stalking. He has served two separate terms in state
prison.

The lawyerfor Defendant #2 approachesA USA Marks and informs the
prosecutor that his client is willing to testify against Defendants #1 and #3
in exchangefor a dismissal of the distributioncount and a recommendation
of a short jail term on the conspiracy count.
Should the prosecutorpursue such a deal?
Given that well over ninety percent of criminal cases are resolved
by plea bargains, 13 ' it is somewhat surprising that plea bargaining in
criminal cases is almost completely unregulated as a matter of professional responsibility. On the particular subject of granting leniency to
a codefendant in exchange for cooperation, neither the text of Model
Rule 3.8 nor the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards provide any direction whatsoever to conscientious prosecutors searching for guidance.
The scholarly literature is similarly unhelpful. While much has been
written both on the repercussions to a defendant when the government enters into a cooperation agreement with an accomplice witness' 32 and the procedures that must be followed, 13 3 the more
fundamental issue of when it is ethically appropriate to grant leniency
13 4
in exchange for cooperation has received little academic attention.
One might legitimately ask whether cooperation agreements present an "ethical" issue at all. Assuming that an accomplice seeks to
obtain leniency by agreeing to testify against a codefendant, the decision of whether or not to allow him to do so certainly implicates issues
of trial strategy. Will the accomplice's testimony be believed by the
jury? Does the government need the testimony to firm up its case
against the remaining defendants? Will it likely force a plea from the
principal defendant, thus sparing the government the expense of a
trial? These are all strategic questions related principally to the issue
of whether bargained-for testimony will make the government's case
stronger against other defendants.
The decision whether to enter into a cooperation agreement with
an accomplice witness also implicates issues of public policy. How
dangerous and morally culpable is the accomplice? Would public
131 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRiUMPH 233 (2003).
132 See, e.g., Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAtN.
L. REv. 1, 40-57 (1992).
133 See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses,
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1129, 1141 (2004) (outlining
safeguards that must be followed after reaching a cooperation agreement).
134 See Samuel J. Levine, Taking ProsecutorialEthics Seriously: A Consideration of the
Prosecutor'sEthical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41
Hous. L. REV. 1337, 1350 (2004).
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safety be compromised if he or she were spared jail time in exchange
for cooperation? When the prosecutor makes an agreement with an
accomplice in exchange for testimony, he is making an implicit decision that the societal benefits to be achieved from convicting a more
culpable actor outweigh the costs associated with granting leniency to
a confederate. Climbing "up the chain" of a criminal enterprise by
using a smaller fish to catch a bigger fish may serve the public interest
by assuring retribution against the most serious actor. "If you are go1 35
ing to try the devil, you have to go to hell to get your witnesses."
But does striking a deal with an accomplice in exchange for cooperation implicate the ethics of the prosecutor? I submit that that it
does, for at least three reasons. First, offering leniency to an accomplice witness in exchange for cooperation gives the witness a powerful
incentive to fabricate his testimony in order to curry favor with the
government.13 6 Accomplices have a natural incentive to minimize
their own involvement in the enterprise and to exaggerate the responsibility of others.' 37 Offering them a "deal" in exchange for cooperation against cohorts magnifies this incentive, because the accomplice
implicitly understands that he is being granted leniency only because
the government believes that he is less culpable than other defendants. The witness is thereafter subtly coaxed-if not explicitly
coached-into relating a version of facts consistent with that view of
the criminal hierarchy.13 8 This implicates the prosecutor's obligation
of candor to the tribunal, and his responsibility not to put a witness on
the stand when the prosecutor knows or it is obvious that the witness
39
will perjure himself.1
135 State v. Sims, 588 S.E.2d 55, 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
136 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperationwith FederalProsecutors:Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FoRDHAm L. Rrv. 917, 932 (1999). In United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'den banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), the
Tenth Circuit ruled that a promise not to prosecute an accomplice in exchange for
his cooperation against others was an offer of a thing "ofvalue" in exchange for testimony in violation of the federal anti-gratuity statute. Id. at 1350-51. "The judicial
process is tainted and justice cheapened when factual testimony is purchased,

whether with leniency or money." Id. at 1347. This ruling was later reversed by an en
banc opinion of the Tenth Circuit, in which the court concluded that Congress did

not intend to limit the "sovereign prerogative" of the government in making plea
bargains by using the term "whoever" in the federal anti-gratuity statute. Singleton,

165 F.3d at 1311.
137 See Steven M. Cohen, What is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor,23 CARnozo L. Rxv. 817, 822 (2002).
138

See Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of Ethical Rules

Can Minimize the Dangers of ProsecutorialLeniency and Immunity Deals, 23 CARDozo L.
REV. 875, 884 (2002).
139 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 3.4 (2004).
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it may be fundamentally imSecond, in certain circumstances
an accomplice solely due to his ac-

moral to offer a favorable deal to
the accomplice has assisted in a
cess to critical information. Where
does any amount-of cooperheinous act (e.g., a brutal child murder),
a reduction in the deserved punation against confederates warrant
"buy" his way out of punishment
ishment? Allowing a defendant to
circumstances undermine the
with future cooperation may in certain
of the criminal law.
retributive and deterrent purposes
may also lead to situFinally, pegging punishment to cooperation
more deeply involved in the crimiations where codefendants who are
to have greater access to crucial
nal enterprise (and therefore likely
than lower-level accomplices,
information) are treated more favorably
is more mornotwithstanding that the mid-level-player-tumed-witness
140 If we accept the premise that bargained-for outally blameworthy.
least bear some relationship to the
comes in criminal cases should at
to
cooperation deals at times can lead
defendant's level of culpability,
41
morally skewed results.

1

of accomplice barNotwithstanding these ethical implications prosecutor's discrechecks on a
gaining, there are very few systemic
exchange for cooperation. The
in
tionary decision to offer leniency
that the Due Process Clause of
Supreme Court has taken the position
where the government uses bar1 42
the Fifth Amendment is not violated
at a criminal trial.
witness
accomplice
an
gained-for testimony from
three primary safeguards in this
The Court adheres to the view that
to defense counsel of any
143
area-disclosure by the prosecutor
made to the witness, 144 the right
promises, rewards, and inducements
and the
the witness for bias,
of defense counsel to cross-examine
acjury that they should evaluate an
judge's obligation to instruct the
FoREST L.
Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE
140 See Stephen J. Schuihofer, Rethinking
penalmandatory
paradox with minimum
REv. 199, 212 (1993) (citing cooperation
information
no
with
for relatively minor players
ties, which can lead to harsh penalties
to offer the government).
Mar. 11, 1991,
When Law PreventsJustice,NAT'L L.J.,
141 See, e.g., Marcia Chambers,
at 13.
some circuits have
U.S. 219, 227 (1941). However,
142 Lisenba v. California, 314
the prosecutor
where
violated
be
safeguards may
taken the position that due process
of a named
conviction
the
to
leading
testimony
conditions an offer of leniency on
United
1986);
Cir.
(7th
791 F.2d 1270, 1300-01
v.
individual. See United States v. Peters,
States
United
generally
See
199 (1st Cir. 1985).
excluStates v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192,
of
se rule
313 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing per
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310,
witness).
the
compensated
sion of testimony where the government
U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
143 Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 293, 311 (1966).
144 Hoffa v. United States, 385
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complice's testimony with caution'45-are together sufficient to protect the defendant from potential unfairness.
Democratic processes similarly provide very little check on a prosecutor's decision to "flip" an accomplice. Most prosecutors on the
state and local level are elected officials.' 46 While the news media may
sometimes question the wisdom and fairness of deals made with accomplice witnesses,14 7 the public does not seem to react to such news
accounts with alarm or dismay, at least at the voting booth. It is exceptionally rare in this country for an incumbent prosecutor to be voted
out of office. 148 The electorate may assume that cooperation agreements are inappropriate subjects for lay scrutiny, because the prosecutor has access to behind-the-scenes information not available to the
average citizen. Or, high-profile convictions that follow accomplice
bargaining may foster public perception of prosecutorial competence
and zeal.
On the question of "how much" of a discount to award to a cooperating accomplice, courts too are reluctant to intrude on what they
perceive to be the prosecutor's executive prerogative,1 49 notwithstanding that ultimate sentencing authority rests with the court. 50 Issues of
the value of cooperation and the importance of the testimony to law
enforcement objectives are considered particularly ill-suited to judicial
review.' 5 1 Where the government seeks to dismiss some or all of the
charges against an accomplice as a reward for favorable testimony,
courts are relatively powerless to deny such a motion.1 52 Where the
145 Id. at 312.
146 William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. Rv.
505, 533-34 (2001).
147 See, e.g., J.M. Lawrence, Hit Man May Hit Street: ProsecutorsGo Easy on Martorano,
BOSTON HERALD, May 14, 2004, at 4; Harvey A. Silverglate, Op-Ed., DisturbingSteps by
Prosecutors, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2004, at A15.
148 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rnv. 125, 152-53 (2004) (noting that incumbent prosecutors seeking reelection in this country are often unopposed, and that "the public's
capacity to hold prosecutors accountable for their actions has thus become more fiction than fact").
149 SeeThe Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 603 (1878); United States v. Gonzalez, 58
F.3d 459, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1995).
150 See Cohen, supra note 137, at 820.
151 See H. Richard Uviller, No Sauce for the Gander: Valuable Considerationfor Helpful
Testimony from Tainted Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 23 CARDozo L. REv. 771, 779-80
(2002).
152 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), "leave of court" is required
before the United States Attorney may dismiss an indictment. In Rinaldi v. United
States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that this leave of court
requirement altered the common law rule that prosecutors have unfettered authority
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government offers to recommend a reduced sentence on the crimes
charged against the accomplice, it is rare for a judge to second guess
the prosecutor's discretion and deny the requested leniency. 5 3 As
one commentator has noted about the federal sentencing system,
"Congress has authorized and the (sentencing] commission has implemented, a system in which the determination of whether a 'substantial assistance' discount is to be granted is left solely to the
5 4
unreviewed discretion of the prosecutor."'
Attorney conduct rules also provide little constraint in this area.
State rules of professional responsibility in effect in most jurisdictions
preclude a lawyer from paying a "fact witness" (i.e., a nonexpert) a fee
for testifying, or conferring a reward on a witness based on the content
of his testimony.1 55 But prosecutors are savvy enough to avoid these
direct prohibitions, by conditioning an offer of leniency on the witness's divulgence of truthful information and cooperation with the
to issue a nolle prosequi; however, the Court ruled that this requirement was de-

signed primarily to protect the defendant against "prosecutorial harassment," such as
charging, dismissing, and recharging. Id. at 29 n.15. The Court in Rinaldi expressly
reserved judgment on the issue of whether a trial court may ever deny an uncontested
motion to dismiss. Id. However, several circuit courts subsequent to Rinaldi have

ruled that a district court may deny an uncontested to motion to dismiss under Rule
48(a) only where dismissal is clearly contrary to manifest public interest, such as
victim, or a
desire to attend a social event rather than trial." In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 787 (3d
Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also
In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2003) (reviewing authorities and stating that no federal appellate court has ever upheld a district court's denial of an
uncontested motion to dismiss).
153 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, ProsecutorialDiscretion, SubstantialAssistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REv. 105, 125-28 (1994).
154 DAVID BOERNER, Sentencing Guidelines and ProsecutorialDiscretion, 78 JUDICATURE
196, 200 (1995). Under the federal sentencing guidelines, a judge may sentence an

where "the prosecutor appears motivated by bribery, animus towards the

offender below the designated sentencing range for a particular offense if the prosecutor files a motion acknowledging that the defendant "provided substantial assis-

tance" in the investigation or prosecution of another. U.S. SENTENCING GUInELINES
MANuAL § 5KI.1 (2005). It is rare for the federal courts to refuse a downward departure after the government has filed a substantial assistance motion. See United States
v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Nicholson, 231
F.3d 445, 451 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's downward departure despite the defendant's nearly contemptuous behavior).
155

MODEL CODE

OF PROF'L

REsPONSIBILrrv DR 7-109(c) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not

pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case."); MODEL RUtu-s
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2004); id. cmt. 3 ("The common law rule in most
jurisdictions is that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying
..... ");see also United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.4 cmts. 1, 3).
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investigation and prosecution of others, rather than on the precise
156
content of future testimony.
If there is any ethical check on this aspect of prosecutorial discretion, it must be gleaned from the "minister of justice" admonition of
Rule 3.8. Yet this directive arguably may point in opposite directions
with respect to cooperating accomplices, depending on the facts of
the case and the context of the bargaining. Justice may demand that
the "big fish" be convicted; if the accomplice's testimony allows the
government to break a difficult case, then perhaps it has promoted,
rather than impeded, justice. After all, the prosecutor cannot prevent
the act that has already been committed; perhaps the most he can do
is assure that all responsible parties are brought to justice for their
roles in the enterprise. 15 7 However, justice may also demand that the
cooperating accomplice pay a sufficient price for his misdeeds; granting too great a discount to him in exchange for cooperation may result in the accomplice escaping appropriate punishment. Overly
generous cooperation agreements may also impede justice in the case
of remaining codefendants by promoting perjured testimony at their
upcoming trials.
Every decision whether to "flip" an indicted co-conspirator requires a contextual assessment of the strengths and weakness of the
case, the relative culpability of the codefendants, the credibility of the
accomplice and whether his testimony can be corroborated, the prior
criminal records of both the accomplice and the other codefendants,
and a balancing of law enforcement priorities and resources. The
U.S. Attorney's Manual-a nonbinding policy manual for federal
prosecutors issued by the Department ofJustice-summarizes the factors that a prosecutor should consider in determining "whether a person's cooperation may be necessary to the public interest."15 8 Section
9-27-620 of this manual suggests that a prosecutor should weigh all
relevant considerations, including:
1. The importance of the investigation or prosecution to an effective program of law enforcement;
2. The value of the person's cooperation to the investigation or
prosecution; and
3. The person's relative culpability in connection with the offense or
offenses being investigated or prosecuted and his/her history with
59
respect to criminal activity.1

156
1997);
157
158
159

See Saavedra v. Thomas, No. 96-2113, 1997 WL 768288, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 12,
Cassidy, supra note 133, at 1137-38.
See Levine, supra note 134, at 1366.
U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION § 9-27.620 (1993).
Id. § 9.27.620.
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obviously it would be
While this summary is a useful guidepost,
as an ethical norm, because
both ineffectual and unenforceable
relative value and relative culhighly subjective determinations such as
equation.
pability are each components of the overall
that even the most seaThese are the sort of difficult decisions
in cases involving viosoned prosecutors lose sleep over, particularly
160 Although most cooperation
lent crimes such as murder or rape.
within a prosecutor's officedecisions are subject to internal checks
before a substantial assis6 1such as obtaining a supervisor's approval
may be dismissedI
indictment
an
or
filed
be
may
tance motion
discretionary decision to a
these safeguards only bump an individual
prosecutorial discretion
higher level of scrutiny; they do not eliminate
attorney or supervisoraltogether. Whether any prosecutor-trial
the multifarious factors at
appropriately recognizes and synthesizes
moral compass of the decistake is dependent upon the internal
on the presence or absence of
sionmaker. That, in turn, depends
virtue.
an ethical approach to this
What might the virtues teach us about
courage to hold out for an
dilemma? First, a prosecutor must have
who seeks to leverage
appropriate disposition from any accomplice
Courage is the virtue that reincooperation in exchange for leniency.
action notwithstanding poforces an actor's will to take appropriate
s. 62
Cooperation deals are usually
tential adverse consequence
providing a nonbinding "proffer"
commenced with the codefendant
reveals information in the coof information to police officers, which
useful to the government's indefendant's possession which may be
Deal Shows System Favors Whites, BOSTON
See Andrea Estes, Black Leaders: Hit Man
to
how U.S. Attorney agonized over whether
HERALD, Sept. 29, 1999, at 16 (discussing
WorkLevenson,
L.
Laurie
also
see
hitman);
make cooperation agreement with mafia
of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM
Responsibilities
Undefined
The
Rules:
the
ing Outside
come
that difficulties in exercising discretion
URR. L.J. 553, 559 (1999) (explaining
of
severity
the
including
not defined by statute,
"in evaluating those factors that are
future
possible
and
past
crime, the defendant's
the crime, the defendant's role in the
of
in trying the case and the likelihood
complexity
victim,
the
to
injury
cooperation,
success").
to
Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice,
161 See, e.g., Memorandum from John
22,
(Sept.
Defendants
on Charging of Criminal
All Fed. Prosecutors, Regarding Policy
http://www.usdojgov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag-516.htm
at
2003), available
federal
The Ashcroft Memorandum requires
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum],
by the
committed
serious, readily provable offense"
prosecutors to charge the "most
has
assistance"
"substantial
(including where
defendant, subject to certain exceptions
has been
supervisor
designated
a
of
approval
been provided by the target and prior
obtained). Id.
162 KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 145.
160
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typically
6 3 In exchange for this proffer, the government
vestigation.'
inproffer
the
obtained during
promises not to use any information
break
negotiations

should future
terview against the codefendant,
the prosecutor then evaludown. 164 After the proffer is completed,
and begins negotiations with deates the accomplice's information
will be offered by the
fense counsel about what consideration testimony. The defense
government in exchange for the accomplice's inappropriate given the
be wholly
attorney's opening demand might
of his client's involvement
magnitude
the
nature of the crime and
you dismiss the trafficking charge
(e.g., "My guy will not testify unless
with a suspended sentence.").
and let him plead guilty to conspiracy
to say no and mean it; that is, he
A prosecutor must have the courage
accomplice's cooperation,
must be willing to try the case without the
price. Only when
exorbitant
an
at
rather than obtaining his assistance
the prosecutor is willing to risk an
a defendant accurately senses that
of the codefendants on less than
acquittal by going to trial against all
have any incentive to agree to a
airtight evidence does the defendant
terms.
disposition of the charges on reasonable
of honesty. First, any reThis problem also implicates the virtue
with the accomplice should fairly
duced charge which is negotiated
Allowing the accomplice to plead
reflect the gravity of the offense.
the public a false sense both of
guilty to a wholly artificial charge gives
is occurring in the court. For
what occurred on the street and what
trafficking in five kilograms of coexample, a defendant charged with
to conspiracy to traffic in cocaine might be allowed to plead guilty
critical to the government's case.
caine if his cooperation is deemed
allowed to plead guilty to possesBut should that same defendant be
the prosecutor is to be accountasion of cocaine for personal use? If
should not be fashioned to
ble at all to the public, plea agreements
a crime which is wholly inconsisallow a defendant to plead guilty to
than fanciful, dispositions are imtent with the truth. Factual, rather
but also to support the work
portant not only for public confidence,
justice system. Probation
of other stakeholders in the criminal
to accurately assess an indirecords enable law enforcement officials
the same defendant later be a
vidual's level of dangerousness should
bogus
Rap sheets which contain
suspect in another criminal matter.
officers, probation officers, or

dispositions are of little use to police
of these reasons, the U.S. Attorjudges in later proceedings. For each
that reduced charges against a
ney's Manual appropriately emphasizes
Atonefar Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and
163 See Michael A. Simons, Retribution
ment, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1, 15 (2003).
164 Id.

.........
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should bear some reasonable recooperating witness in federal court
criminal
extent of [the defendant's]
65
lationship "to the nature and
basis."1
"an adequate factual
conduct" and should have
in another important respect.
Honesty is critical to this decision
about giving the accomplice too
A virtuous prosecutor will be cautious
barbuild safeguards into the plea
great an incentive to lie, and will
typiperjury. One way prosecutors
gaining process to protect against
key
rather than falsity is to corroborate
cally attempt to promote truth
or
of events with physical evidence,
details of the accomplice's version
some
of
witnesses. In the absence
with testimony from nonbiased
accannot be confident that the 166
such corroboration, the prosecutor
leniency.
for
others in exchange
complice is not falsely implicating
if
corroboration presents an anomaly;
Of course, this insistence on
indepenbe
version of events could
every detail of the codefendant's
coopbe no need to bargain for his
dently corroborated, there would
of an
In most situations, the value
eration in the first instance.
in inverse proportion to the informaaccomplice's testimony increases
coopprosecutor; that is, accomplice
tion already in possession of the
cannot
there are certain facts that
eration is needed precisely because
1 67 Nevertheless, one of the key facbe proven without his testimony.
a
determining whether to enter into
tors the prosecutor must assess in
witthe
of
accomplice is the reliability
cooperation agreement with an
accomtested if some aspects of the
68 In
ness's story. This can only be
important respects.'
in
corroborated
are
events
plice's version of
the prosecutor must view one
performing this credibility assessment,
as acting as an agent of the truth.
of his primary responsibilities
can also structure the plea negoA prosecutor striving for honesty
rather
a manner that promotes truth
tiations with the accomplice in
way to promote honesty is to condition
than falsehood. One common
to
on the accomplice's obligation
the government's offer of leniency
clause
escape
government an express
169
tell the truth, and to give the
accomplice commits perjury.
the
if
agreement
under any written
stand his
that if he lies on the witness
The witness then appreciates
not
punished
be
and he may
deal with the government is canceled,
perof
crime
charged but also for the
only for the offenses originally
note 158, § 9-27.430.
165 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra
of a defendant
effect prohibiting the conviction
in
statutes
166 Many states have
See Hughes,
accomplice.
an
from
testimony
solely on the basis of uncorroborated
supra note 132, at 31.
167 Cohen, supra note 137, at 822.
174,
Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV.
168 SeeJohn Kaplan, The Prosecutorial
183 (1965).
17-19.
169 Simons, supra note 163, at
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jury. Of course this check, while necessary, is not in and of itself sufficient to prevent accomplice fabrication. Perjury by an accomplice
might be difficult to detect and prove; actors enmeshed in a criminal
enterprise might be able to lie convincingly precisely because they
know better than law enforcement officers which facts are indepen1 70
dently verifiable and which are not.
Other methods of structuring the plea negotiations can also help
to promote truthful testimony. First, the prosecutor during the negotiation process should take care not to "horseshed" the witness into
relating a particular version of events consistent with the prosecutor's
theory of the case. Where the government withholds promises of leniency during initial interviews with the accomplice (e.g., "I don't believe you," 'You are lying," "I know your partners distributed more
cocaine than that," etc.), the prosecutor is sending a message that a
deal will be struck with the accomplice only when he relates a version
of facts more inculpatory of codefendants. This can lead to
fabrication by desperate accomplices looking to curry favor with the
government. Professor Ellen Yaroshefksy interviewed twenty-five former prosecutors on the subject of accomplice cooperation, and concluded that many prosecutors and criminal investigators approach
witness interviews with rigid theories of guilt, causing them to 1) signal to cooperating witnesses what testimony is expected, and 2) fail to
dig deeply for inconsistencies that might rebut this preconceived theory.' 7 1 Due to the overwhelming pressure on an accomplice to please
and to conform, perhaps the spirit-if not the express text-of the
Model Code's antiperjury provision 1 72 should be construed to prohibit a prosecutor from affirmatively coaching an accomplice witness
73
during proffer sessions.1
The prosecutor can also promote honesty by ensuring that defense counsel for the codefendants has the tools necessary to crossexamine any accomplice in order to expose bias or fabrication. This
requires 1) having police officers or agents memorialize interviews
with accomplices in writing, in order to allow for discovery of the witness's statements as they evolve and change over time;' 74 and 2) dis170 Yaroshefsky, supra note 136, at 921.
171 Id. at 952-55.
172 MODEL RuiLs oF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2004) ("A lawyer shall not .
counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely ..
173 Ross, supra note 138, at 886-88.
174 Id. at 888. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000) (obliging federal prosecutor to
disclose at trial all written statements made or adopted by witness, or all "substantially
verbatim" records of oral statements made contemporaneously with the interview),
with Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (requiring prosecutor to turn
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accomplice witness, whether
closing all promises of leniency to the
5
or oral.1
formal or informal, written
that should motivate a
Fairness is also an important consideration
negotiations with an accomplice
virtuous prosecutor structuring plea
of fairness with respect to the
witness. I have already discussed issues
of charges against a cooperatvictim (in terms of the honest selection
to those defendants who will proing accomplice) and with respect
disclosure of exculpatory Giglio
ceed to trial (in terms of full
who may want to coopmaterial). What about fairness to defendants useful information to
have little
erate with the government, but may
discretion in this area is the
prosecutorial
provide? One concern with
that is, defendants who are more
so-called "cooperation paradox";
may be better able to leverdeeply enmeshed in the criminal milieu
players.1 7 6 Should a prosage leniency for themselves than lower-level
player in exchange for his
ecutor enter into a deal with a mid-level
player serving less time in
cooperation that results in the mid-level
the hypothetical posed at the beprison than a lower level player? In
be fulfilling his obligation
ginning of this Part, would the prosecutor
#2 (the "lieutenant") served less
as a "minister of justice" if Defendant
(the "bodyguard")? Is the differtime in prison than Defendant #3
with the helpful testimony of
ence in their criminal records, coupled
a disparity?
the lieutenant, sufficient to justify such
codefendants in particular
among
This tension between equity
cases with respect to similar
cases and sentencing uniformity across
defendants are charged with ofcrimes is particularly acute where the
In those situations,
fenses carrying a minimum mandatory sentence.
to impose a sendiscretion
no
for example, a federal judge has almost
if they are conby witness, whether written or oral,
over prior inconsistent statements
from writing
agents
discourage investigative
stitutionally material). Many prosecutors
the proffer
of
stage
early
the
during
interviews
official reports of accomplice witness
and they
time
the witness's story will change over
process because they anticipate that
the RelucConfronting
material. John G. Douglass,
to
do not want to create discoverable
beginning
are
courts
Some
1797, 1836 (2001).
tant Accomplice, 101 CoLuM. L. RPv.
production
requiring
by
reports
in generating
respond to such intentional reticence
agents, whether or not they are formalenforcement
law
by
taken
notes
of interview
1999) (order36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (C.D. Cal.
ized. See United States v. Sudikoff,
made by
statements
of
notes and summaries
ing discovery of government's
547,
cf. Spicer v. Roxhury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d
cooperating witness during interviews);
during proffer
statement
inconsistent
prior
oral
556 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that
which should have been disclosed).
session was impeachment material
also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
175 Cassidy, supra note 133, at 1171; see
and
requires disclosure of promises, rewards
154 (1972) (indicating that due process
inducements to government witnesses).
at 211-13.
176 Schulhofer, supra note 140,
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lenient than the legislature has
77
tence on the defendant that is more
substantial assistance.
provided
has
defendant
the
specified unless
bodyguard had no prior criminal
Suppose in my hypothetical that the
against his two codefendants but
record, and was willing to cooperate
about the organization not alcould provide little inside information
from other sources. Does justice
ready available to the prosecution
to jail for ten years?
demand that Defendant #3 still go
about inequities flowing from
A virtuous prosecutor concerned
possible options, both of which
the "cooperation paradox" has two
the interests of fairness. First, a
should be seriously considered in
that a lower level defendant has
prosecutor who legitimately believes
with law enforcement and atin good faith submitted to an interview
has little useful information to protempted to cooperate, but simply
the defendant for "substantial
vide, could nonetheless credit
practical
that his information was of little
assistance" notwithstanding
1 78 Ultimate determinations on cooperation
use to the government.
judge to im3553(e) (Supp. 111 2003) allows the
177 In federal court, 18 U.S.C. §
a motion
makes
minimum where the government
pose a sentence below the statutory
in the invesassistance
substantial
of the defendant's
for a lower sentence on the basis
(giving judge
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000)
others.
of
tigation or prosecution
certain speciin
for
mandatory sentences called
discretion to deviate from minimum
assissubstantial
of
absence
Act even in the
fied sections of the Controlled Substances
the use
involve
not
did
crime
the
criminal record,
tance if defendant has only minor
role in
injury, the defendant played a minor
bodily
serious
or
to
of a weapon, violence
prior
truthfully provided to the government
the
the organization, and the defendant
concerning
has
evidence the defendant
sentencing "all information and
offense").
system does not
assistance" motion in the federal
178 A government's "substantial
a precondeparture. This motion is merely
give the defendant a right to a downward
The
guidelines.
to depart from the sentencing
dition to a judge exercising discretion
the
with
rests
depart
to
depart and by how much
1997);
ultimate decision of whether to
Cir.
(3d
429-30
420,
F.3d
v. Casiano, 113
sentencing judge. See United States
of situa1241 (5th Cir. 1990). For examples
1239,
F.2d
910
United States v. Darner,
the trial
and
filed a substantial assistance motion
tions where federal prosecutors have
States v.
United
see
allow a downward departure,
court has nonetheless refused to
defenthat
ruling
review
to
Cir. 2001) (refusing
v.
Busekros, 264 F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th
States
United
and
information")
"with any useful
abuse
dant did not provide government
not
did
court
1995) (finding that sentencing
Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th Cir.
to testify
"not at all convinced" that willingness
it
its discretion in declaring that was
departure).
assistance
substantial
a
to warrant
against others if necessary was sufficient
the wide latitude given to prosecutors
criticized
have
Schulhofer
and
Professors Nagel
because this
has provided substantial assistance,
in determining whether a defendant
Sentencing
Federal
the
that may undercut
decision allows for biased judgments
Guidelines' goal of uniformity:
is that they are made by individual
The problem with such equity judgments
set sentencing rules, thereby
nationally
prosecutors without regard to the
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degree of involvement in
should be made based on the defendant's
investigation

to assist in the
the criminal enterprise and his willingness
Access to information is

of others, not on mere access to information.
much toward aggravation as toa double-edged sword that points as
Whether the prosecutor can
ward mitigation in terms of culpability.
that the defendant has proconscientiously represent to the court
turn on the cooperating defenvided substantial assistance should
government fairly perceives that
dant's efforts and good faith. If the
was feigning ignorance in orduring a proffer session an accomplice
assistance departure would
der to protect others, then a substantial
not be warranted.
has not provided substantial
Even where a lower-level defendant
striving for fairness may
assistance to the government, prosecutors
recommendations with respect
nonetheless structure their sentencing
attempts to avoid inequity.
to all of the defendants in a way that
a mandatory sentence, the proseWhere the charges do not implicate
sentencing recommendations
cutor has flexibility to craft equitable
charges an offense carrying
for all defendants. Where the indictment
for fairness might prompt
a minimum mandatory sentence, concerns
to dismiss the indictment
the prosecutor in appropriate situations
allowing him to plead
pending against the lowest level defendant,
mandatory term of imprisonguilty to a lesser offense not carrying a
compromising the uniformity and cerintroducing sentencing disparity and
such individually made equity judgtainty goals of the guidelines. Further,
and social-class bias, notwithstanding
ments open the door to race, gender,
AUSAs hoping to "save" sympathetic
the good intentions of individual
defendants.
of
A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study
Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer,
L.
CAL.
S.
66
Guidelines,
the Federal Sentencing
Charging and BargainingPractices Under
here is that the inevitable tension between
argument
My
REV. 501, 535-36 (1992).
in particuthe system and fairness to individuals
uniformity among defendants across
Prosecutorial
Note,
discretion. See Arnie N. Ely,
lar cases militates in favor of some
Memorandum's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's
Ashcroft
The
Discretion as an Ethical Necessity:
237, 248-49 (2004). If substantial assistance
Duty to "Seek Justice,"90 CORNELL L. REV.
injustices
would have no power to alleviate the
were narrowly defined, a prosecutor
individual
Certain
paradox discussed above.
that can result from the cooperation
office guidelines consti-aining a prosecuenacted
have
offices
United States Attorney's
assistance" determination, such as requirtor's discretion in making the "substantial
requiring that a defendant earn
committee,
a
ing that 5K1.1 motions be approved by
defendant's
covert activity, or requiring that the
a 5Kl.1 departure by engaging in
note 153, at
supra
Lee,
See
individuals.
assistance lead to the indictment of additional
and there
isolated,
been
have
enactments
125-28. To date, however, these policy
discreto eliminate altogether a prosecutor's
have been no efforts on a national level
tion to file a substantial assistance motion.
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ment.179 A virtuous prosecutor will appreciate that a harsh minimum
mandatory sentence for a low-level player in a criminal enterprise may
sometimes result in injustice where a mid-level player has "flipped,"
and will thus take steps necessary to avoid that result.
To summarize, accomplice bargaining encourages prosecutors to
view witnesses in instrumental terms; that is, as means to secure convictions against other defendants. The government's widespread reliance on this practice leads prosecutors to view convictions as
objectives paramount to other values in the criminal justice system,
such as accuracy, equity, and procedural fairness. This dynamic tends
to obscure and at times obstruct ethical decisionmaking. My goal in
this Part has been to demonstrate that a prosecutor who is attentive to
the virtues of honesty, courage, fairness, and prudence will be better
equipped to make difficult ethical choices about whether to offer leniency to a charged accomplice in the first instance, and about structuring a cooperation agreement and an ultimate sentence in order to
promote true and fair results.
III.

THE

PROBLEM OF THE "APPARENTLY" TRUTHFUL
DEFENSE WITNESS

Assistant District Attorney Jack Jones is prosecuting a defendant
charged with assault and battery. The defendant is accused of beating the
victim during a barroom brawl, causing substantial bodily injury.
The victim claims that he and the defendant entered into an argument
while watching a football game one afternoon in a sports bar. Insults were
traded, and the argument became heated. According to the victim, the defendant pushed him, at which point the victim tried to punch the defendant to
protect himself, but missed. The defendant then pounced on the victim and
severely beat him, causing a broken nose, two black eyes, and lacerations on
the face.
Defendant claims self-defense. Defendant testifies that the victim
started the fight by pushing the defendant off of his bar stool and by threatening him with a beer bottle. Who started the fight (and with what level of
force) are the key issues in the case.
The defendant calls as a witness the bartenderwho was on duty at the
time of the fight. Although the bartender did not witness the start of the
physical altercation (he was serving patrons at the other end of the bar and
179 For federal prosecutors, the requirement of the Ashcroft Memorandum that
the prosecutor charge the "most serious, readily provable offense" may foreclose this
option in the absence of substantial assistance. See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra
note 161. For an attack on the Ashcroft directive and a spirited argument that a
prosecutor's ethical obligation to "seek justice" assumes the existence of charging discretion, see Ely, supra note 178, at 250-51.
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and the victim at the time the fight
his back was turned to the defendant
leading up to the fight. The barstarted) he did hear some of the argument
that the victim was drunk and belligertender testifies on direct examination
the defendant (including calling
ent, and that he was repeatedly insulting
and "loser").
him derogatoy names such as "moron"
has previously been convicted
bartender
the
that
The prosecutorknows
the prosecutor impeach the bartender
of receiving stolen property. Should
with this prior conviction on cross-examination?

tribunal precludes him from ofA lawyer's duty of candor to the
180 However, when an advoto be false.
fering testimony that he knows
on cross-examination he is not
cate impeaches a truthful witness
has already
"offering" false evidence. He is discrediting testimony that
of
equivalent
testimony is not the
been offered. Discrediting truthful
similar
fact, although it certainly has a
affirmatively presenting a false
of fact away from truth and toward
effect because it points the finder
between two professional obligafalsehood. The uneasy tension
the tribunal and the duty of vigorous
tions-the duty of candor to 1 8 1
-has led to heated debate18 about
2
advocacy on behalf of a client
impeach a truthful witness.
to
appropriate
when it is ethically
it is ethically appropriate, if not
Most scholars now agree that
truthdefense attorney to impeach a
ethically required, for a criminal
on how
18 3 However, these same commentators diverge
ful witness.
Some rest their argument on the
they reach this widely-shared view.
duty to
the criminal defense lawyer's
presumption of innocence and
a reamet its burden of proof beyond
insure that the government has
a
184 Others suggest that the right to cross-examine
sonable doubt.
to
criminal defense lawyer's access
truthful witness grows out of the
attorthe
on
his client, and the burden
confidential information from
was
be imposed if defense counsel
ney-client relationship that would
R. 3.3(a)(3) (2004).
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUic-r
by recRule 3.3 underscores this tension
to
2
181 Id.; see also id. R. 1.1. Comment
has an
proceeding
"
an advocate in an adjudicative
ognizing that La] lawyer acting as
force."
case with persuasive
obligation to present the client's
the
the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within
Cross-Examining
Lawry,
P.
an
182 See Robert
For
(1996).
100 DicK. L. REV. 563, 577-78
Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering,
that
outweighs
tribunal
duty of candor to the
argument that in civil cases an attorney's
supra
cross-examination, see WOLFRAM,
during
advocacy
attorney's duty of zealous
note 125, § 12.4.5, at 650-51.
(summarizing authorities).
183 Lawry, supra note 182, at 577-78
Defense Counsel's
Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of
184 David G. Bress, Professional
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1494 (1966); Warren E. Burger,
Responsibility, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1493,
14-15
11,
L,Q.
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5AM.
A Judge's Viewpoint,
in supductfor Prosecution and Defense Personnel:
argument
"Burger-Bress"
to be known as the
(1966). This position has come
attorney to impeach a truthful witness.
defense
criminal
a
port of allowing
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required to forego cross-examination based on facts revealed to him
in confidence. 185 Still other commentators argue that this latitude
stems from the criminal defense attorney's duty of zealous advocacy,
and the possible inference of guilt a jury might draw against a criminal defendant if counsel were to fail to vigorously cross-examine a government witness. 186 While not adopting any one of these three
rationales to the exclusion of others, the American Bar Association
has agreed that a criminal defense attorney may properly impeach a
truthful witness) 7 In its CriminalJustice Standards,the ABA states that
"'(d]efense counsel's belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the
' 88
truth does not preclude cross-examination."
But what about the prosecutor'sobligation in this situation? Few of
the rationales for recognizing a criminal defense exception to a duty
of candor during cross-examination support allowing a prosecutor to
undermine the credibility of a person the prosecutor reasonably believes has testified truthfully. The prosecutor bears the burden of
proof in criminal cases; his obligations point toward establishing reliable evidence, rather than discrediting it. The prosecutor does not
have an individual client who can provide him with confidential information. Moreover, the prosecutor has a moral obligation as a minister of justice to try to ensure that the innocent are not convicted. 8 9
Inviting the jury to disbelieve relevant truthful testimony may increase
the risk of an erroneous verdict. Finally, reasonable jurors may expect
that a representative of the government will conduct himself with less
partisanship than a private attorney; 190 thus, it may be less likely that a
185 Freedman, supra note 2, at 1474-75.
186 See David Luban, The Adversay System Excuse, in THE GooD LAwvfR 83, 92
(David Luban ed., 1984) ("The goal of zealous advocacy in criminal defense is to
curtail the power of the state over its citizens. We want to handicap the state in its
power even legitimately to punish us."); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
257-58 (1967) (White,J,, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
criminal defense attorney's mission bears little relation to the "search for truth.").
187 One reference in the comments to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards (albeit
in the section discussing the prosecution function) might suggest that the ABA found
the Burger-Bress "burden of proof' argument most compelling in enacting Standard
4-7.6. "In this regard, it is believed that the duty of the prosecutor differs from that of
the defense lawyer, who on occasion may be required to challenge known truthful
witnesses of the prosecution in order to put the State to its proofs." ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 3-5.7 cmt.
188 See id. Standard 4-7.6(b).
189 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETICs
309, 321-23 (2001) (arguing that the prosecutor has a legal and ethical duty to promote truth and to refrain from conduct that impedes the truth).
190 Cf Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (suggesting that ethical
missteps by a prosecutor may influence the jury more than analogous ethical missteps
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juror will draw a negative inference against the state's case from the
government's failure to cross-examine a witness than it may from the
same omission by defense counsel. Each of these differences may
point to an obligation on the part of the prosecutor to observe greater
restraint in cross-examination than the criminal defense attorney.19"
On these grounds, both Bruce Green and Samuel Levine have independently concluded that it is "clearly" unethical for a prosecutor to
impugn the credibility of a witness known to be telling the truth.1 9 2
While at first blush this imperative seems sound-especially in
light of the "minister of justice" mandate of Rule 3.8-the Green/
Levine conclusion may be both overly facile and overly broad. It is
overly facile because it is rare for a prosecutor to "know" that a witness
is telling the truth. In the hypothetical described above, does the
prosecutor "know" that the victim was drunk and prompted the barroom altercation with the defendant through the use of belligerent
language? The prosecutor may have no reason to disbelieve the bartender's version of events in this regard, but that does not mean the
witness's narrative is known to be true. Even if the prosecutor is privy
to extrajudicial facts that supported the bartender's testimony, the
prosecutor does not necessarily know the truth of these facts, because
he was not present at the scene of the crime. For example, let us
imagine that two other eyewitnesses interviewed by the police at the
scene of the crime, but presently unavailable to testify, support the
theory that the victim was drunk and belligerent at the time of the
fight. These two other bar patrons interviewed by the police may be
lying, or each might harbor some form of bias against the victim.
What we have here is a problem of epistemology. A prosecutor's belief in the truth of a fact may vary by degree, but his "knowledge" of
that fact is seldom absolute.' 9 3
by a defense attorney because of the jurors' comparative expectations about the two
roles).
191 The Supreme Court has stated that a public prosecutor, as a servant ofjustice,
has an obligation not to present false evidence or engage in other trial methods "calculated to mislead the juiy." Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
192 Green, supra note 20, at 1596; Levine, supra note 134, at 1345; see also WOLFRAm, supra note 125, § 12.4.5, at 650-51 (arguing that while there is general agreement that defense counsel may attempt to persuade a jury to disbelieve a witness
known to be truthful, it is clear that prosecutors should not be permitted to do the
same).
193 Imagine a criminal case where the defendant presents an alibi defense through
a relative (e.g., the defendant's cousin testifies that he was with the defendant at a
restaurant having dinner on the night and time of the alleged crime). The cousin
produces a credit card record that reveals a charge at the same restaurant on the
night in question. Even with this paper record, the prosecutor does not "know" that
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Furthermore, Professor Green's and Professor Levine's resolution of this difficult issue may be overly broad because it fails to distinguish between general forms of impeachment and specific forms of
impeachment. A general form of impeachment suggests that the witness is an untruthful person (e.g., impeachment with prior acts of dishonesty or reputation for dishonesty, impeachment with prior
conviction, etc.) 194 and provides the jury with a reason to disregard all
of the witness's proffered testimony if it chooses to do so. A specific
form of impeachment (e.g., an impeachment with a prior inconsistent
statement on the same topic)19 5 invites the jury to disbelieve one part
of the witness's testimony. It is rare in criminal cases for a witness to
testify to only one salient fact. Telling a prosecutor that he may not
"impugn the credibility"1 96 of a truthful witness fails to distinguish between circumstances where the witness testifies to only one fact, or
testifies to several facts. In the latter circumstances, it fails to answer
the question whether a prosecutor is ever warranted in attempting to
undermine a portion of a witness's testimony through a generalform of
impeachment.
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards shed very little light on this
difficult issue. Standard 3-5.7(b) provides as follows: "The prosecutor's belief that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude crossexamination, but may affect the method and scope of cross-examination. A prosecutor should not use the power of cross-examination to
discredit or undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows the witness is
testifying truthfully."'19 7 This standard accomplishes little beyond stating what should by now be obvious; when a prosecutor knows that a
witness is telling the truth he should not attempt to discredit that testimony, but where he simply believes that the witness is telling the truth
he may cross-examine the witness.19 8 The ABA standard fails to recogthe cousin has testified truthfully. Someone else may have used his credit card at the
restaurant, or the cousin may have dined at the restaurant with another guest. Now
suppose that there was a security camera in operation at the restaurant. The videotape shows two diners matching the general description of the defendant and his
cousin (age, sex, race, height), but the picture is grainy. Even then, the prosecutor
does not "know" that the cousin is telling the truth.
194 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 608(b), 609.
195 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 613.
196 Levine, supra note 134, at 1345.
197 ABA CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 3-5.7(b).
198 The National District Attorneys Association guidelines for prosecutors (The
"National Prosecution Standards") take a position on this issue similar in its vagueness
to ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 3-5.7. Section 77.6
states that "Counsel should not misuse the power of cross-examination or impeachment to ridicule, discredit, undermine, or hold the witness up to contempt, if counsel
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nize the wide gulf in most cases between the extremes of knowledge
and belief, and thus provides little ethical guidance for the conscientious prosecutor striving to do what is just. Even more significantly, it

does not offer any distinction between general and specific forms of
impeachment, suggesting instead that the "method" of cross-examination rests solely in the discretion of the individual prosecutor.
This may be a situation where rules simply fail us. Even if Standard 3-5.7 were enacted in some fashion as a component of ABA
Model Rule 3.8, it would be largely unenforceable. Fashioning limits
to the scope of a prosecutor's cross-examination based on the state of
mind of the prosecutor would be destined for failure, because such
subjective knowledge or belief is rarely provable as an objective matter
in later professional disciplinary proceedings.
Character is essential to a prosecutor's nuanced assessment of the
facts and circumstances of particular cases in this area. Rather than
asking the question what prosecutors should "do" in this situation,
perhaps we should change the focus and inquire into what types of
people we want them to be. In particular, the virtues of courage and
fairness might help guide prosecutors in discerning an appropriate
course of action when faced with the question of whether to crossexamine an apparently truthful witness.
First, the prosecutor should be courageous enough to forego
cross-examination entirely wherever he perceives that this course of
action is in the best interest of justice. Sometimes the hardest phrase
for any lawyer to utter in a courtroom is "No questions, Your Honor."
Hollywood depictions of withering cross-examinations in criminal
cases have become ingrained in our consciousness. The lawyer is perceived as gladiator, and the citizens of Rome enter the coliseum expecting to witness bloodshed. Prosecutors may feel that if they forego
cross-examination, they run the risk of being viewed as weak-not
only by the jurors, but also by any law enforcement colleagues in the
courtroom observing the trial. Government lawyers must resist this
pernicious attitude. Prosecutors who flex their muscles in the courtroom solely for the purpose of posturing in front of the jury have lost
sight of the critical difference between their role and the role of criminal defense counsel. Moreover, a prudent and courageous prosecutor
understands that sometimes the decision not to cross-examine a witness is a sign of integrity and strength rather than weakness. The
phrase "No questions, Your Honor" can be a display of confidence
knows the witness is testifying truthfully." NAT'L DIsT. AroRNEys Ass'N, NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 77.6 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS] (emphasis added).
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testified to by the witness are
that signals to the jury that the facts
theory of its case.
wholly consistent with the government's
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be cognizant of the tremendous
present concern. A prosecutor must
it may feel as a witness to have
power of cross-examination, and how
in a public forum. Experone's credibility and integrity questioned
point of view of the "other" might
iencing the courtroom from the
and content of his cross-examinahelp the prosecutor shape the scope
at all. The Model Rules of Protion, if cross-examination is conducted
during representation of a
fessional Conduct prohibit an attorney
no substantial purpose other than
client from using means that "have
person."1 99 Cross-examination
to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
is lying on a critical matter certhat attempts to show that the witness
because it assists the jury in detainly serves a "substantial purpose,"
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ciding contested facts. But what about
only on minor details of the witthat are used to impeach a witness
with a prior conviction
ness's testimony? For example, impeachmentembarrassing to the witnot only be
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portion of his narrative, and only
has testified truthfully during a large
details (such as his perception of
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sledgehammer where a scalpel may
time, distance, etc.). By using a
be pursuing a "substantial purpose
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within a fair reading of Rule 4.4.
testify in criminal cases unWitnesses who are subpoenaed to
expectation that they will be vigordoubtedly arrive at court with the
by defense counsel. However,
ously and searchingly cross-examined
different from their governthey have a right to expect something
District Attorneys Association has
ment representatives. The National
of all witnesses should be conducted
stated that "[t]ihe interrogation
for the dignity and legitimate
fairly, objectively, and with due regard
privacy of the witness.
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of gladiators
Prosecutors who play the role

other than to embarrass or inon cross-examination for little purpose
the public's confidence in the
timidate the witness risk undermining
the very citizens the governcriminal justice system, and offending
with critical information.
ment depends upon to step forward
Comment 1 to Rule 4.4

CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2004).
199 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
justifying crossproof is a "substantial purpose"
suggests that testing the government's
requires a lawclient
a
to
attorney. "Responsibility
examination by a criminal defense
Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 1.
of others to those of the client...."
yer to subordinate the interests
supra note 198, § 77.6 cmt.
200 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
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While it may be impossible to formulate a workable rule that provides both guidance and flexibility in this area, a few general principles emerge from the foregoing discussion. First, a prosecutor's mere
belief that the witness is telling the truth should never preclude crossexamination. The very purpose of an adversary proceeding is to have
the truth revealed through the crucibles of direct and cross-examination. Prosecutors need not substitute their personal feelings or gut
hunches for the possible conclusions of the jury. 20 1 On the other
hand, prosecutors frequently have access to extrajudicial evidence
that the jury will never hear, including statements from witnesses unavailable to testify at trial, information from confidential informants,
and other forms of inadmissible hearsay. What the prosecutor can
reasonably conclude happened in the case is influenced not only by
facts provable in court, but also by information contained in the investigatory file. Perhaps a workable principle that bridges the wide gap
between "knowledge" and "belief' is that a prosecutor should not undermine the credibility of a witness on a factual point where the prosecutor firmly believes that no reasonable juror, in possession of the
same information known to the prosecutor, could reasonably conclude that the fact is untrue. A "firm belief" standard-taking into
account both the evidence produced at trial and any extrajudicial information in possession of the prosecutor-might adequately respect
both the jury's ultimate role as factfinder and the prosecutor's moral
responsibility as an agent of the truth. In my hypothetical above, if
the prosecutor firmly believes that the bartender is telling the truth
about the victim's intoxication and belligerence, he should not raise
the issue of the witness's prior conviction on cross-examination because this would serve no legitimate purpose other than to embarrass
and to misleadingly discredit the witness.
This analysis still begs the question of whether there should be
any distinction between specific and general forms of impeachment,
an issue left completely unaddressed by ABA Criminal Justice Standard 3-5.7. It would make no sense to advise a prosecutor that when a
witness has testified truthfully in part and deceptively in part the prosecutor may not engage in a general form of impeachment.2 02 If, as
the law presumes, a prior act of dishonesty or a prior conviction is
201 "[A] prosecutor is not required to substitute personal opinion for the available
fact-finding processes of the trial ... " ABA CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note
10, Standard 3-5.7 cmt.
202 The pertinent National District Attorneys Association standard states that
"Ithe credibility of any witness may be alluded to by a showing of any prior conviction." NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 198, § 77.6. This standard suggests that a general form of impeachment may be warranted even where the
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probative of credibility, it is no less probative on this point simply because the witness has testified to several subject matters rather than to
just one. Even the most inveterate and accomplished liar is capable of
telling the truth on occasion when it suits his purpose. Perhaps the
appropriate safety valve here is not in limiting cross-examination, but
rather in limiting closing argument. The virtues of honesty, fairness,
and courage suggest that a prosecutor who engages in a general form
of impeachment of a witness who he believes has testified truthfully in
part but untruthfully in part should refrain from arguing in his summation that the witness is unworthy of belief in all respects; rather, he
should argue only that the witness's character for dishonesty should
lead the jury to disbelieve identified parts of the witness's testimony.
In this manner, the prosecutor avoids urging the jury to discredit testi20 3
mony that the prosecutor has strong reason to believe is true.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF THE INCOMPETENT DEFENSE ATrORNEY

Assistant District Attorney Susan Smith is prosecuting a defendant
charged with armed robbery. The defendant allegedly stole an elderly woman's purse at knifepoint as the victim was coming out of an automatic
teller machine (ATM) kiosk. The victim picked the defendant out of a group
of mug shots at the police station several hours after the incident, and is able
to identify him at trial. The defendant has several prior convictions on his
record, includingfelony convictions for larceny by false pretenses and distribution of heroin, and several misdemeanor convictions for shoplifting.
The defendant is represented at trial by attorney Jay Sullivan, appointed counsel. Priorto trial, Sullivan moves to suppress the photo identification. After a hearing on this motion, it is denied by the court. Sullivan's
trial strategy is to 1) question the victim's opportunity to get a good view of
her attacker (it was admittedly dark outside the kiosk and the incident lasted
only a matter of several seconds), and 2) to present an alibi defense. The
defendant testifies on his own behalf at trial that he was having Sunday
dinner at his cousin's house at the time of the alleged robbery. Defendant is
impeached by the prosecutor on cross-examinationwith the prior convictions.
The prosecutor is concerned about the competence of defense counsel.
Attorney Sullivan appears to the prosecutor outside of the courtroom to be
very harried,disorganized,and sufferingfrom stress. Although he litigates a
nonfrivolous motion to suppress in the case, he does not appear to have
adopted a trialstrategy beneficial to his client. There are several inconsistenprosecutor believes the witness is testifying truthfully as to certain matters and untruthfully as to others.
203 Providing the jury with reasons not to believe a truthful witness may be as misleading to the jury as urging it to believe false testimony. Cf In re Dreiband, 77
N.Y.S.2d 585, 585-86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (upholding disciplinary sanction against
prosecutor for "knowingly using false testimony of People's witness in summation").
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cies between the victim's trial testimony and the account of the incident she
gave to police officers reflected in a written report (concerning the time of the
incident, the clothing worn by the attacker, the precise location on the street
that the robbery took place, etc.). Attorney Sullivan does not raise these inconsistencies on cross-examination of the victim, relying instead exclusively
on issues pertaining to the victim's opportunity to get a good look at the
perpetrator'sface. Moreover, Attorney Sullivan does not put any witnesses
on the stand to support defendant's alibi defense other than the defendant
himself, who Sullivan should have anticipatedwould have been subject to a
stinging impeachment.
Forty years after the Supreme Court guaranteed indigent persons
the right to appointed counsel when charged with serious crimes, the
promise of Gideon v. Wainwright 20 4 remains largely unfulfilled in our
country. With disturbing frequency, criminal defendants plead guilty
to crimes or are convicted following trial after being represented by
an attorney who does not have the time, the ability, the resources, or
the inclination to provide meaningful and competent representation.
A recent report from the American Bar Association supports this sobering conclusion: "Too often the lawyers who provide defense services are inexperienced, fail to maintain adequate client contact, and
furnish services that are simply not competent, thereby violating ethical duties to their clients under rules of professional conduct. Meanwhile, judges . . . routinely accept legal representation in their
courtrooms that is patently inadequate.."20 5 This recent ABA study
cited inadequate funding, poor training, lack of resources for investigative and expert services, and grossly excessive caseloads as factors
contributing to the pervasive problem of ineffective representation by
criminal defense lawyers. 20 6 While this problem is not limited to ap20 7
pointed counsel, studies suggest that it is more acute in this area.
204
205

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
ABA STANDING COMM.

ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,

GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, at iv-v

AM. BAR

ASS'N,

(2004).

206 Id. at 7-19; see also Bruce A. Green, CriminalNeglect: Indigent Defensefrom a Legal
Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1178 (2003) (calling the problem a "national
epidemic of neglect").
207 See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JusrICE 78-79 (1999). A 1999 study in Harris
County, Texas showed that of 30,000 annual felony filings, 58% of defendants with
appointed counsel were sentenced to jail or prison, compared to 29% of defendants
who retained private counsel. Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County's
Courts, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 17, 1999, at Al. To adjust for sentencing and conviction patterns over a wide variety of crimes, the study also looked at one single felony

charge for the same period (first time possession of less than one gram of cocaine)
and determined that 57% of those defendants with court-appointed counsel were sentenced to jail or prison, while only 25% of those defendants with private counsel were

sentenced to serve time. Id.
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clients, cannot fire their lawyer
Indigent defendants, unlike paying
when they are displeased with the
and hire someone more competent
20°
services of their attorney.
do when faced with a
What should a conscientious prosecutor
Not surprisingly, neither the
scenario such as that outlined above?
nor the ABA Criminal Justice
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
responsibilities when confronted
Standards address a prosecutor's
If there is an answer to be gleaned
with incompetent defense counsel.
with a prosecutor's obligation
from professional norms, it must start
con20 9 On the one hand, the prosecutor must be
to seek justice.
toward the defendant, who may eicerned with fundamental fairness
of a lesser crime, or 3) be factually
ther 1) be innocent, 2) be guilty
counsel, of securing an acquitguilty, but capable, with more effective
addition, the prosecutor who sustal based on reasonable doubt. In
his opponent has an institutional
pects incompetence on the part of
of his office and the appellate
interest in protecting the resources
of counsel claims later raised on apcourts from ineffective assistance
and lead to unnecessary litigation.
peal, which will tie up the system
might personally be illOn the other hand, the prosecutor
lawyering from legitimate trial
equipped to separate incompetent
served in the defense role himself.
strategy, especially if he has never
the defense attorney may have
In the hypothetical described above,
the victim with a prior incondeliberately chosen not to cross-examine
perceived by the jury as "beating
sistent statement for fear of being
Defense counsel may be unable
up" on a sympathetic elderly woman.
alibi due to pragmatic conto call a witness to support the defendant's
in the cousin's background to
siderations, such as substantial material
the defense counsel might have
impeach him as a witness. Moreover,
from the defendant that affects his
access to privileged information
that is unknown to the prosecutor.
tactical decisions in the case, but
expected to distance himself
Can a prosecutor realistically be
to assist a defendant whom he perfrom his adversarial role in order
The prosecutor, like the deceives is being inadequately represented?
and an ethical obligation to
fense attorney, has a client (society)
0
2
vigorously. 1
represent his client's interests

While society certainly

to the criminally accused, society
has an interest in providing fair trials
seeing that guilty persons are punalso has a compelling interest in
Green, supra note 206, at 1175.
MODEL
supra note 10, Standard 3-1.2(c); see
ABA CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS,
R. 3.8. cmt. 1 (2004).
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must also act
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3
OF
210 See MODEL RULES
client and with zeal in advothe
of
the interests
with commitment and dedication to
cacy upon the client's behalf.").
208
209
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ished and prevented in the future from preying on law abiding citizens. It is difficult to see how a prosecutor could continue to function
effectively in a trial setting (particularly in closing argument and in
cross-examination) if he viewed his primary responsibility during ad211
versarial proceedings as assuring the defendant a level playing field.
Unfortunately, Sixth Amendment safeguards are inadequate to
prevent the injustices that can and do occur when a criminal defendant is poorly represented. 12 In Strickland v. Washington,2 13 the Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test for evaluating ineffective
assistance of counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment. First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient; that
is, that counsel made errors so serious that in effect he was not functioning as "counsel" at all for Sixth Amendment purposes. Second,
defendant must show that this deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant; that is, that the outcome of the trial would likely have been
different but for the mistakes of counsel. The defendant must make
2 14
both of these showings to demonstrate a constitutional violation.
To evaluate counsel's performance under the first prong of Strickland, the standard for attorney performance is that of an ordinarily
fallible lawyer.2 15 The Court has stated that judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential to the lawyer because it
is too tempting in hindsight for a defendant to second-guess counsel's
efforts after an adverse judgment.2 1 6 The defendant must overcome
the presumption that the counsel's performance under the circumstances might be considered sound trial strategy. 217 To overcome this
presumption, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation
2 18
fell below an objective range of reasonableness."
Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant
must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense.2 19 This prong requires more than a showing that counsel's er211 See Hobot v. McGuiness, No. 96-CV4324 FB, 1998 WL 642705, at *18 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16, 1998) (ruling that prosecutor had no constitutional duty to notify the court
of existence of report that defense counsel had neglected to use at trial); Fisher, supra
note 12, at 226 n.135.
212 SeeJeffrey Levinson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standardfor Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CmiM. L. REv. 147, 177-78 (2001).

213 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
214
215
216
217
218
219
day as

Id. at 687-90.
Id.
Id. at 689.
See id.
Id. at 688.
See id. at 692. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), decided the same
Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that in rare circumstances ineffective assis-
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the outcome of the proceeding,
220 "The
rors had some conceivable effect on
could meet that test.
omission
or
act
every
virtually
because
a reasonable probability that, but
defendant must show that there is
the result of the proceeding
for counsel's unprofessional errors,
"reawould have been different.

' 22 1

The Court in Strickland defined

sufficient to undermine confisonable probability" as "a '2probability
a
22
The defendant must thus show
dence in the outcome.
result
process that makes the
breakdown in the adversarial
unreliable .223

standard under Strickland
If the ineffective assistance of counsel
where the defendant was actuwere sufficient to capture all situations
perhaps there would
ally prejudiced by his counsel's incompetence,
duty on prosecutors to react to (or
be no reason to impose any ethical
those circumstances, the risk of
rectify) poor defense lawyering. In
sufficient incentive to prompt govreversal on appeal might itself be a
standard is so narrow that reernmental vigilance. But the Strickland
assistance of counsel are very
versals of convictions for ineffective
and
that counsel was competent,
225 Secrare. 224 First, there is a presumption
of proving otherwise.
defendant bears the burden on appeal
against the conduct
measured
be
ond, defense counsel's conduct will
highly competent attorney,
of a reasonable attorney, not a perfect or
strategic
into whether it could have been a
tance can be presumed without inquiry
that
ruled
Court
the
the case. Id. at 659-60. But
dedecision or whether it prejudiced
the
represent
to
counsel was appointed
the facts of Cronic-where inexperienced
trial-did
before
days
twenty-five
fraud case only
fendant in a highly complex mail
per se
Id. at 659. The justification of a
prejudice.
of
presumption
a
not warrant
is not
inquiry
prejudice is so high that case-by-case
a
approach is that the likelihood of
mentioned
Court
the
at 692. In Strickland,
worth the cost. See Strickland, 466 U.S.
Court
of interest as one example where the
defense counsel laboring under a conflict
to
assistance of counsel. Id. Subsequent
in
would be willing to find per se ineffective
se
per
prejudice
find
have been willing to
Strickland and Cronic, the federal courts
Cir.
(2d
684
682,
F.3d
77
Walker,
e.g., Tippins v.
only very limited circumstances. See,
903 F.2d 883,
the trial); United States v. Novak,
through
slept
counsel
1996) (defense
frauduthrough
bar
obtained admission to the
884 (2d Cir. 1990) (defense counsel
(finding
(1976)
88-89
80,
United States, 425 U.S.
lent means); see also Geders v.
where the court interferes with defendant's
Amendment
Sixth
prejudice per se under
overnight
not to consult with client during
representation by ordering counsel
recess).
220 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
221 Id. at 694.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 687.
DeThe Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent
224 See Note, Gideon's Promise Unfufilled:
F.3d at 690 (finding
2068 (2000); see also Tippins, 77
fense, 113 HAuv. L. Rrv. 2062,
trial).
because counsel slept every day at

ineffective assistance of counsel only
225 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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an objectively reasonable attorand the Court has expressly defined 226
Third, the defendant must
ney as someone who makes mistakes.
have been different had he
convince the court that the result would
2 2 7 in light of the
counsel;
been represented by more competent
the finality of convictions, provCourt's stated interest in upholding
have done under different circuming what a hypothetical jury might
especially where the government's
stances is exceedingly difficult,
backward after trial to assess
evidence of guilt is compelling. Looking
to an unjust conviction "overlooks
228
whether counsel's deficiencies led
The
of counsel's performance."
creature
a
is
itself
trial
the
that
created by allegedly incompetent
appellate court is analyzing a record
to rest on strong or overwhelming
counsel; the conviction may appear
defense counsel failed to properly
evidence of guilt precisely because
or failed to pursue exculpatory
cross-examine government witnesses
to show in hindsight that omissions
evidence. It is particularly difficult
because there it is a question
by defense counsel made a difference,
do
but rather of what he neglected to
not of what the lawyer did badly,
is
[claim]
an "ineffective assistance
at all.2 29 For each of these reasons,
2 3°
to prove."
easily alleged but almost impossible
Court invoked concepts of funIn Gideon, some members of the
to provide indigent criminal
damental fairness in joining the decision
23 t But since Strickcounsel.
defendants with the right to appointed
jurisprudence has shifted
land, the Court's focus in Sixth Amendment
to considerations of reliability;
away from considerations of fairness
of counsel is violated only where
that is, the constitutional assurance
errors so serious that the result of
the defendant's lawyer committed
32 This shift in emphasound. 2
the proceeding cannot be considered
on
233 Appellate courts will reverse a conviction
sis has been critical.
only where they are convinced
the grounds of ineffective assistance
have made a difference in the
that more competent counsel would
is akin to validating the results of
outcome of the case. This approach
lost the
that the claimant would have
a track meet on the grounds
that the losing runner was provided
race anyway-notwithstanding
and
coaching, and training facilities,
unequal access to equipment,
226 Id. at 688.
227 Id. at 694.
of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity
228 Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance
242, 275 (1997).
Standard, 88J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1188.
at
229 Green, supra note 206,
230 Dripps, supra note 228, at 284.
U.S. 335, 349 (Harlan, J., concurring).
231 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
232 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
at 279.
233 See Dripps, supra note 228,
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was required to start the race ten yards behind his opponent. If gross
disparities led to an unfair contest, how can one say with confidence
that the outcome would not have been any different with a more level
playing field?
Certainly the prosecutor is not alone in shouldering responsibility for policing the adequacy of defense services. The judge, too, has
an obligation to seek justice, and a far more neutral role in the trial
process than the government advocate. 23 4 The primary responsibility
to ensure a level playing field should rest with the judge, rather than
with the prosecutor. Several commentators have called upon trial
judges to play a more active role in spotting and remedying defense
incompetence when it occurs, as a way to make up for the perceived
deficiencies of appellate review under Strickland.2 35 But judicial vigilance alone will not relieve prosecutors of the need to act in certain
extreme circumstances, because certain forms of defense incompetence will be imperceptible to the judge. The prosecutor is more familiar with the facts of the case than the judge, and thus will be more
sensitized to weaknesses in the government's case that the defense attorney fails to exploit (exculpatory evidence, prior inconsistent statements, etc.). The prosecutor may also have had dealings with the
defense attorney outside the courtroom that give rise to suspicions of
unpreparedness or incompetence (e.g., witnessing tremors or glassy
eyes that raise the suspicion of substance abuse, or hearing the defense counsel confuse the facts of defendant's case with those of another client during plea discussions). The prosecutor may also be
aware of a conflict of interest on the part of the defense counsel that

234 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004).
235 See, e.g.,
Galia Benson-Arm-am, Protecting the Integrity of the Court: Trial Court Responsibility for PreventingIneffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 425, 429-30 (2004) (placing burden on the court to remedy ineffectiveness before it gets to appeal, and arguing that the presumptive prejudice standard of Cronicshould be followed where defense counsel is "egregiously ineffective" at
trial and the court fails to inquire of defendant whether he is satisfied with his representation); Green, supra note 206, at 1194 (arguing that judges should inquire more
deeply about defendant's satisfaction with defense counsel and defense counsel's efforts on client's behalf during change of plea colloquy, and should refuse to accept
plea if unsatisfied); Russell G. Pearce, RedressingInequality in the Marketfor Justice: Wy
Access to Lauyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will
Help, 73 FOROHAM L. REV. 969, 970-78 (2004) (arguing that we should move from a
paradigm of judges as passive umpires to the paradigm of judges as active umpires,
enabling them to ask questions of a witness to lay the foundation for the admission of
evidence, or raise legal issues that the parties missed).
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would not be apparent to the judge. 236 Closer scrutiny by trial judges
of defense performance may reduce the acuity of this ethical dilemma
for public prosecutors, but it cannot eliminate the problem
altogether.
The professional obligation of lawyers to report ethical misconduct by fellow attorneys to state licensing authorities is also an inadequate check on defense incompetence in criminal cases. Today, all
states but Kentucky and California have mandatory reporting rules
fashioned in whole or in part on ABA Model Rule 8.3 and its predecessor, ABA Model Code provision DR-1-103 (A).237 But this reporting
obligation-often derisively termed the "snitch rule"-is one of the
most "underenforced, and possibly unenforceable" mandates in all of
legal ethics.2 38 Attorneys have trouble determining when opposing
counsel's inattention or poor performance rises to the level of an ethical violation. 239 Moreover, many states follow Model Rule 8.3(a) and
provide that the ethical infraction observed must raise a "substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" before an obligation to report is triggered. 240 Prosecutors who confront a defense lawyer performing inadequately in a
particular matter might attribute it to poor preparation on that specific case, and may have little basis for concluding that such inattentiveness has spilled over to the other areas of his practice. In addition,
state snitch rules often are unclear on how strong a lawyer's suspicion
241
of ethical wrongdoing must be before a duty to report is triggered.

236 See United States v. Hedrick, 500 F. Supp. 977, 983 (C.D. 111.1980) (noting that
prosecutor has obligation as minister ofjustice to call to the court's attention a possible conflict of interest presented by defense counsel representing codefendants).
237 Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Current Development, A Current Look at
Model Rule 8.3: How Is It Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 747, 755 (2003).

238 Id. at 747. Indifference, fear of damaged reputation among colleagues, and
concern over the time and energy it will take to follow through with a bar disciplinary
report all combine to make the reporting obligation found in DR 1-103(A) and its
successor Rule 8.3 one of the most "widely ignored" attorney conduct rules. SeeWOLFRAM, supra note 125, § 12.10, at 683.
239 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTr R. 1.1 (2004) ("A lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client.").
240 See id. R. 8.3(a) (emphasis added); WOLFRwA, supra note 125, § 12.10, at 684
(arguing that the "substantial question" provision of Rule 8.3 is vague and indefinite).
241 See Ott & Newton, supra note 237, at 751 (noting that most courts interpreting
the word "knowledge" in Rule 8.3 have equated knowledge with "substantial basis for

belief").

2006]

CHARACTER

AND

CONTEXT

For each of these reasons, there is scarce authority under Rule 8.3 for
imposing a duty on prosecutors to report incompetent defense counsel.2 4 2 More fundamentally, however, the "snitch rule" cannot possi-

bly protect a criminal defendant from the harsh consequences of an
incompetent trial attorney, because the professional obligation of the
prosecutor under Rule 8.3 is to report defense counsel to the bar disciplinary authority after the triggering event, not to the court before
whom the ethical lapse occurs. 243 A defendant may be convicted and
sent to prison as a result of the errors of defense counsel; the snitch
rule-leading at most to a post-conviction professional censure-cannot possibly remedy this unfairness.
Several scholars have addressed the issue of whether and when a
prosecutor has an ethical obligation to intervene to address ineffective
defense lawyering, but they have come to markedly different conclusions.244 While recognizing that codes of professional conduct fail to
define a prosecutor's ethical obligations in this complex area, Fred
242 See Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Profl Conduct, Formal Op. No. 98-02 (1998)
(stating that where a criminal defense lawyer files affidavit of ineffectiveness on appeal of criminal conviction, the appellate prosecutor has ethical obligation under
Rule 8.3 to report this ineffectiveness to bar overseers if the appellate claim raises a
"substantial" issue of trial counsel's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice
law); cf In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1249-50 (La. 2005) (ordering public reprimand of prosecutor for violation of Rule 8.3, where prosecutor had learned that a
prosecutorial colleague had suppressed exculpatory blood evidence in an armed robbery case and failed to report it).
243 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R, 8.3(a) (requiring report to "appropriate professionalauthority") (emphasis added).
244 Monroe Freedman was perhaps the first academic to address this ethical issue.
See Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the ProsecutingAttorney, 55
GEo. L.J. 1030 (1967). In that article Freedman discussed the prosecutor's responsibility when confronted with ineffective counsel, but only briefly. Freedman concluded that because "the job of the prosecutor is not necessarily to convict, but to see
that justice is done" a prosecutor cannot sit idly by and allow defense counsel to
render inadequate assistance. Id. at 1032. Freedman highlighted some of the tactics
prosecutors have engaged in to actually exploit the situation where incompetent counsel represents the defendant, such as seeking ajudicial forum where defense counsel
is more likely to overlook the defects in the prosecutor's case, putting favorable comments about defense counsel in the prosecutor's closing argument in an effort to
insulate a conviction from successful attack on appeal, and structuring a plea agreement in order to give the appearance that defense counsel has performed adequately
on behalf of his client when in fact the case was overcharged from the beginning. Id.
at 1040-41. Freedman illustrated the seriousness involved in a prosecutor's ethical
obligations by highlighting examples of unethical conduct in the face of defense ineffectiveness, but he offered no solution to the question of how bad a defense attorney's
conduct must be before a prosecutor has a duty to intervene, or exactly what form this
intervention should take.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:2

Zacharias has argued that the obligation to seek justice at a minimum
obliges a prosecutor to preserve the basic requirements of an adversarial system.2 45 Zacharias identified an efficient adversarial system as
a key element of the justice mandate, because our system relies upon
the adversarial process to ensure procedural fairness. 246 But
Zacharias argued that the adversarial justice system breaks down most
noticeably "when a criminal defense attorney does not even roughly
match the prosecutor's talents or fails to represent his client's interests. 12 4 7 Effectively, that produces a proceeding that is a one-sided
contest.248 In those situations, according to Zacharias, the prosecutor's responsibility as a "minister ofjustice" requires him to attempt to
"restore adversarial balance," that is, to disavow zeal and instead promote procedural fairness. 249
In constructing this argument, Zacharias imagined three levels of
substandard defense performance: 1) defense counsel makes no serious effort in defense of his client whatsoever, because he has no trial
skills, is drunk, or is senile; 2) defense counsel performs, but he performs very badly by failing to ask important, relevant questions of witnesses on cross-examination or by relying on an incoherent theory;
and 3) defense counsel presents adequate direct and cross-examinations and generally performs aggressively, but he neglects to file a
meritorious suppression motion or fails to object to damaging questions from the prosecutor.2 50 In the first scenario, Zacharias was confident that the prosecutor has witnessed a Sixth Amendment violation
and therefore has an ethical obligation to undertake remedial steps to
preserve the integrity of the trial process, such as notifying the judge
or filing a motion to disqualify counsel. 25 1 But for the second two
scenarios (occurring far more often), Zacharias was far more tentative
in both his approach and in his proposed solutions. Zacharias appeared to accept the conclusion that as long as the defense lawyer
stays within "the wide range of professionally competent assistance"

245 Zacharias, supra note 19, at 46-48.
246 Id. at 49.
247 Id. at 66.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 64.
250 Id. at 68-69.
251 Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibility
when Defense Counsel has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 341 (1989)
(arguing that a prosecutor has a duty to intervene whenever defense counsel is acting
with a conflict of interest or is providing constitutionally ineffective assistance).
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the prosecutor has no responsibility to act whatsoever.2 52 Where the
defense counsel's performance clearly falls below this acceptable
range of conduct, the prosecutor should remedy the adversarial
breakdown by either notifying the judge or by remonstrating with defense counsel and encouraging him to either improve his performance or withdraw. 253 Among these two options,254 Zacharias
reluctantly concluded that reporting lax opposition to the court is the
most appropriate remedy whenever the prosecutor is "convinced of
defense counsel's inadequacy."2 5 5 But Professor Zacharias failed to
explain how a prosecutor can ever become so "convinced," given that
1) the prosecutor is engaged in an adversarial role of his own, and 2)
the prosecutor seldom is in the best position to perceive the reasons
behind defense counsel's choices.
Vanessa Merton recently analyzed this same thorny ethical dilemma, but arrived at a conclusion very different from that of Fred
Zacharias. Approaching the problem from the perspective of a supervising attorney presiding over a law student prosecution clinic, Merton
concluded that an ethical duty to remedy defense inadequacies is im25 6
practical to impose in practice.
252 Zacharias, supra note 19, at 69.
253 Zacharias advances and rejects a third possibility: that a prosecutor could remedy poor performance by defense counsel by "pulling his punches" and providing less
than vigorous advocacy on behalf of the state. Zacharias properly rejects this response, because rather than improving the adversarial process, this approach eliminates the adversarial process completely. Id. at 70. Zacharias similarly rejects
"helping" the defense counsel by introducing testimony favorable to the defendant,
recognizing this as a subset of prosecuting less vigorously. See id. at 71-72. While
hypothetically the prosecutor could remain within the adversarial role by simultaneously eliciting defense information from witnesses while continuing to argue against
the significance of this evidence, Zacharias argues that prosecutors would find it very
difficult to do this without breaking up the flow of their own presentations, and that
even if they did the mere mention of a possible defense argument is not the
equivalent of arguing in favor of its strength. Moreover, if prosecutors routinely exercised the option of eliciting information favorable to the defense, in the long run this
may reduce the adversarial nature of trials because some defense counsel may come
to rely on such assistance and therefore become even less vigilant. Id. at 71.
254 Zacharias recognized the huge practical difficulties of the remonstration approach. Id. at 72. Confronting an attorney about his own incompetence or lack of
attention to a case would certainly be a delicate conversation that many attorneys
would be unable to handle in a productive fashion, even if they were willing to undertake it in the first instance.
255 Id. at 71, 74.
256 Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of the Sixth
Amendment" if You're Trying to Put that Lawyer's Client inJail?, 69 FoRD"ni L. Rev. 997,
1047-53 (2000).
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At the outset, Professor Merton professed that her initial inclination when analyzing an ineffective assistance of defense counsel situation would have been to err on the side of fairness and seek to protect
the rights of the defendant.2 57 However, Merton poignantly recounted an egregious case of ineffective counsel which arose for her
student prosecutors, where she could not bring herself to insist that
they do just that.258 While observing her students during a pretrial

conference in a domestic violence case, Merton witnessed egregious
behavior by the defense counsel that created an ethical dilemma
about how the prosecutors should proceed. 25 9 Specifically, the defense counsel met with the student prosecutors showing no knowledge about the facts of the case, his client's name, or even the charges
against him. Defense counsel had failed to return phone calls from
the student prosecutors, and had coupled this rudeness with making a
racial slur against one of the prosecutors at their first courtroom introduction. Counsel clearly had not communicated with his client about
the underlying nature of the charge or the client's objectives. Compounding this ignorance, he inadvertently waived the attorney-client
privilege and allowed his client to speak to the prosecutors in the
courtroom corridor, making damaging admissions. 260 Defense counsel thus single-handedly converted a possible dismissal into a solid
case by inducing his client to provide a full confession, without ever
having spoken to his client beforehand. 26 1
Faced with defense counsel's utter lack of competence, Professor
Merton and her student prosecutors faced the dilemma of whether to
intervene, and if so how? Merton realized that the defendant could
not afford a better attorney, and that his rights were being violated by
the lack of competent representation. Ethically, she believed that they
should take action by warning defense counsel about the consequences of his actions, or by alerting the trial judge and asking for a
disqualification. But the prosecution team was also faced with a terrified and beaten victim, a dangerous defendant, and a belligerent and
confrontational defense counsel who would not be open to assistance,
let alone criticism. 262 Merton's assessment of the scholarly literature,

including Fred Zacharias's article discussed above, 263 bolstered her instinct that an ethical duty on the part of the prosecutors may have
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1002.
See id. at 1008-17.
See id. at 1005-17.
Id. at 1014.
See id. at 1017-18, 1040-41.
See supra notes 245-55.
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existed in light of the "seek justice" mandate; however, when faced
with a real life situation of incompetent counsel, she struggled to find
an answer about how best to act upon such a duty. 2 6 4 Merton was
disturbed by the possible effects on professionalism in commenting
on the reputation or abilities of opposing counsel,2 6 5 voicing concern
about the "ethics war" that could be triggered if prosecutors routinely
acted upon a perceived duty to report defense inadequacies to the
presiding judge. 266 Also, Merton questioned whether an individual
prosecutor-as part of a public office-realistically has the power to
take remedial action in individual cases without a supervisor's approval, often not obtainable in the thick of action.2 67 Finally, Merton
viewed "reporting" as typically ineffective-trial judges are unlikely to
remove counsel, and even if they do, the system cannot guarantee that
replacement counsel will be any better or more prepared. 2 6

Merton

reluctantly concluded that although it may be warranted as a matter
of discretion, there is no ethical requirement to remedy defense lapses
absent a clear constitutional violation under Strickland. Justifiably, she
remains worried that there is a gap between commitment to ethical
principles in the abstract, and specific performance in accord with
that principle in the context of particular cases. 26 9
Considering the practical obstacles Merton recounts so skillfully,
perhaps it is not surprising that few prosecutors, if any, ever take steps
to rectify defense ineffectiveness. 27 0 The Rules are imprecise, and tensions pulling in the opposite direction abound. One reason that
scholars have struggled with this ethical dilemma-and that
rulemakers have totally ignored it-is that the only clear answer to the
problem may be "it depends." Whether a prosecutor needs to intervene in the face of incompetent counsel will likely depend upon 1)
how flawed the representation is; 2) how serious the consequences to
the defendant are (e.g., is defendant facing a felony conviction and
jail time, or only a first offense misdemeanor); 3) whether the defen-

264

Merton, supra note 256, at 1041-44.

265

Id. at 1039.

266
267

Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1043.

268 Merton imagines her students reporting the conduct of defense counsel to the
trial judge, and the judge responding "'Let me get this straight-you got an airtight,
dead-on, all-bases-loaded confession, IN the presence of counsel, and now you're
complaining?'" Id. at 1041.
269 See id. at 1004.
270 See Smith, supra note 13, at 396.
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dant is represented by appointed or retained counsel; 27 1 and 4) how
perceptible the flawed lawyering may be to the presiding judge. Assuming that the prosecutor decides that some intervention is necessary,
he then faces the equally complex issue of how best to address the
problem. The answer to this question will likely depend upon 1) the
stage of the case in which the incompetence arises; 2 72 2) the prosecu-

tor's prior experience with the defense counsel (e.g., a familiarity with
defense counsel's work habits and personal style may give the prosecutor a reason to believe or disbelieve that private remonstration with
the attorney will be effective in addressing the deficiency); and 3) the
prosecutor's assessment of the judge's willingness to intervene if the
problem is brought to his attention.
Rather than focusing on rules and remedies, what if we changed
the focus of our inquiry for a moment and asked what type of person
we want our public prosecutors to be? We can begin by identifying
the wrong reasons for standing by and doing nothing in this situation.
One impediment to prosecutors taking action when faced with incompetent defense counsel may be lack of courage-they may fear losing
the case, or fear being perceived as weak by colleagues in law enforcement if they step back from their adversarial role and advocate, even
momentarily, for the interests of the defendant. Professor Merton's
very honest account of her inability to act on a perceived ethical duty
in this regard seems to suggest precisely such a failure; she recalls fearing that both the judge and higher-ups in the District Attorney's office
would react negatively to such a suggestion by an individual student
prosecutor who acts as a guest in the prosecutor's office. 273 Another
impediment to ethical action may be a lack of commitment to fairness-what Bernard Williams calls a "settled indifference" to the interests of others. 274 Prosecutors may be incapable of seeing the
271 As argued supra note 207 and accompanying text, where the defendant has the
financial resources to retain private counsel, he has more leverage over the services
rendered and more ability to discharge the attorney if necessary.
272 If the perceived incompetence occurs prior to a change of plea, the court's
voluntariness colloquy with the defendant-if thoroughly conducted-may provide

some assurance that there is a factual basis to the plea and that the defendant is
satisfied with his counsel's representation. If the perceived incompetence occurs well
in advance of trial, the government may assent to a motion for a continuance and
thereby give the defense attorney more time and incentive to prepare. See Stuard v.
Stewart, 401 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that the prosecutor wisely
advocated with the court for more time for defense counsel to prepare, in order to

preserve the record from a challenge that defendant was forced to choose between
effective assistance of counsel and his right to a speedy trial).
273 Merton, supra note 256, at 1042.
274 WILL"AMS, supra note 88, at 93.
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defendant as an "other" worthy of respect, and thus disinclined to
take any action designed to further the defendant's interests. If we
expect prosecutors to both recognize and protect a defendant's constitutional right to competent counsel, we need them to be attentive
in the first instance to these virtues of fairness and courage.
Perhaps the paramount virtue needed in this situation is the virtue of prudence, or practical wisdom. A prudent prosecutor must be
able to recognize and synthesize the multiplicity of concerns at
stake.2 7 5 There are many legitimate interests pointing in the direction
of doing nothing-such as a hesitance to interfere with deliberate but
opaque choices made by defense counsel, a practical concern for the
prompt resolution of cases, and a hesitance to poison the atmosphere
of the courtroom by publicly accusing another lawyer of incompetence. But a prudent prosecutor will also recognize that taking an
ostrich-like approach to serious ineptitude may not avoid a clash of
these interests; sometimes it may only defer them. If the defendant is
sentenced and incarcerated, he may later challenge his conviction on
appeal claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
This may be the most intractable of my three ethical dilemmas. It
is not simply a question of the prosecutor perceiving his role too narrowly. The problem also stems from epistemological failures (i.e., the
prosecutor having insufficient expertise and information to separate
deliberate tactical decisions from incompetence) and systemic failures
beyond the prosecutor's control (i.e., lack of resources). If the defense attorney's incompetence is so egregious that it clearly violates
Strickland, we do not need an ethical rule to spur meaningful government action, because where the incompetence is both gross and apparent, the prosecutor will be motivated by self-interest to preserve
the conviction from successful attack on appeal. Where ethical judgment is paramount is where the defense attorney's representation is
flawed, but just one iota above the impoverished constitutional standard. How should a prosecutor behave when the defense attorney's
representation is within this zone of (mis)conduct?
In light of the myriad contexts in which this problem may arise, it
is impractical to fashion a clear set of priority rules that will address all
of the factors discussed above and still give meaningful guidance to
prosecutors. The best we could possibly hope for is a statement somewhere in the comments to Rule 3.8 that a prosecutor has an obligation
to take proactive measures to protect the defendant's right to counsel
(either remonstration with the attorney or notification to the judge)
when the prosecutor perceives that the defense attorney's representa275

KRONMAN, supra note

120, at 74.
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tion fails the first prong of the Strickland test; that is, when counsel's
performance falls measurably below the range of conduct expected of
a reasonably competent attorney.2 7 6 It makes no sense to invite a
prosecutor to take action only when the prosecutor perceives that both
prongs of Strickland are satisfied, because under the second prong of
Strickland the appellate court is looking backward at the trial to assess
the reliability of the result. It would be unworkable to ask a prosecutor to speculate about a future appellate court's assessment of the reliability of a proceeding that has not yet concluded. At most, such an
approach would invite prosecutors to intervene or not intervene to
protect defendant's right to counsel based solely upon the prosecutor's individual assessment of the government's evidence. Ensconced
in their adversarial role in the thick of trial, it may simply be asking
too much of prosecutors to objectively assess the weaknesses of their
own case.
My point in this Article, however, is not to recommend insertion
of some vague and passing reference to the first prong of Strickland
somewhere in the comments to Model Rule 3.8. That would be both
ineffectual and unenforceable. 27 7 My point is different. If we recognize that a prosecutor's decisions in this area are contextually driven,
this reality magnifies, rather than trivializes, the importance of virtue.
Prosecutors should care about the quality of defense services rendered
to the accused, and should not retreat like tortoises into the shell of
their prosecutorial role. As a profession, however, we cannot be confident that prosecutors will even recognize this as an ethical problemmuch less take personal ownership of it-unless the prosecutor is a
person of fairness and honesty. We certainly cannot predict that a
prosecutor will have the personal fortitude to intervene in any fashion
unless they are persons of courage. And we cannot possibly expect
prosecutors to be able to identify creative and effective ways to address
the incompetence of their adversaries in particular cases unless they
have developed the virtue of prudence.

276 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
277 Model Rule 3.8(d) contains a requirement that prosecutors disclose evidence
to the defense that "tends to negate the guilt" of the accused. This ethical norm is
patterned after the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963). Yet bar disciplinary authorities rarely discipline prosecutors for failing
to fulfill their ethical duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, preferring instead to defer to the judicial branch's enforcement of analogous constitutional norms on appeal
from conviction. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor
Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 703 (1987).
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CONCLUSION

"[C]haracter might help us survive the corruption of our
278
codes."
-Thomas Shaffer
A prosecutor's duty to act as a minister of justice is not a "supererogatory"-the term ethicists often use to describe voluntary action
which promotes the good.2 79 Comment I to Rule 3.8 attempts to
make clear that the justice norm is mandatory rather than hortatory,
by emphasizing that a prosecutor has a "responsibility" to seek justice. 280 However, this message is obscured both by the placement and
context of the 'justice" directive. By dressing up certain minimum
conduct rules within Rule 3.8 as ethical requirements, and then burying the 'justice" exhortation in a later comment to the Rule, the drafters may be sending the signal that this conduct is optional rather than
mandatory. This is a mistake. The responsibility to seek justice is an
admonition with ethical content that demands serious moral
reflection.
Those who struggle with rules "know well the limits of rule-making and rule implementation."2 81 As the drafters of the Model Rules
recognized, "no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined
by legal rules."28 2 There is room for both specific rules and general
norms in ethics codes, depending on their purpose.2 8 3 Forcing lawyers to act in a particular way and setting forth discipline when they
fail to follow that requirement is the goal of specific rules. Causing
lawyers to reflect on their roles and internalize duties is more appropriately left for general norms. 2 4 In this "rules versus standards" debate, both sides have valid claims. Standards can be amorphous and
unenforceable. Rules may cause the regulated community to see minimal compliance as ethical behavior, rather than a floor below which
their conduct may not fall.
278 SHAFFER, supra note 7, at 172. Shaffer argues that workable ethical codes in the
professions are those that depend on character, and that ethical codes in which that
dependence is not implicit are corrupting. Id. at 113. In this Article I have argued
that dependence on the character of prosecutors is implicit in the "minister ofjustice"
mandate of Rule 3.8.
279 Perkins, supra note 49, at 198.
280 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (emphasis added).
281 Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal
Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REv. 3, 5 (2005).
282

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr Scope

283

Zacharias, supra note 12, at 224.

284

Id. at 228-34.

para. 16 (2004).
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of prosecutorial ethics I
With respect to the three hard questions
be impossible to be any more
' 28
have discussed in this Article, it may
the "seek justice 5 standard.
precise in our professional code than
complexity of factual contexts in
As I have argued, the variety and
arise belie any attempt at further
which these three ethical dilemmas
may be the most workable and
specificity. The "seek justice" mandate
decisionmaking in each of
appropriate standard for prosecutorial
prosecutors to view their roles
these areas if it in fact encouragestheir obligations. -2 6
about
broadly and to be reflective
enacting more specific rules
Nonetheless, the choice between
prosecutors to develop office
and leaving it to elected and appointed
staff attorneys (accompanied with
policies to guide the discretion of
does not exhaust the range z2of7
appropriate training and supervision)
policies
call for development of office
available alternatives. The
lawyers about the various factors to
will at most help inform individual
decisions. Because there
consider in making highly contextualized
theory and actual decisions in
will always be gaps between practical
on a "general reductive method or
practice, it will be difficult to agree
certain basic ethical decisiona clear set of priority rules" to structure
are not self-executing-they
making. 218 Moreover, office policies
real situations, in real time,
must be implemented by individuals, in
to secure a conviction.
amidst public and institutional pressure
reference to the moral asProfessional norms are hollow without
actors working within their
pirations and sensitivities of individual
of the moral self, prosecutors will
framework. Absent a development
any ethical content to the "seek jusnot be willing or able to discern
skill to discern what is right" lies
tice" admonition. "The honesty and
the
28 9 Virtue cannot be taught in law school (although
in the virtues.
begin in law school, particconversation and the practice can certainly
supra note 10, Standard 3-1.2(c).
285 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS,
"seekjustice" mandate
Levine likened the
n
286 See Levine, supra note 134, at 1346.
tradition to "'i all of your ways acknowlto the similarly broad directive in the Jewish and concluded that "it may be not only
3:6),
edge God,'" id. at 1340 (quoting Proverbs
the prosecutor's ethical duties through
consider
to
helpful but perhaps necessary
such as the provision requiring that the
guidelines articulated in broad principles
prosecutor seek justice." Id. at 1346.
note 21, at 897 (arguing that unless and
287 See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra
definition of neutrality, chief prosecutors
until the profession agrees upon a coherent scrutiny principles that will govern the
public
should identify and make available for
offices).
their
by
decisions made
288 Postema, supra note 39, at 67.
289 Perkins, supra note 49, at 189.
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ularly in a clinical setting) .290 It also cannot be commanded by rules.
"One of the main impetuses for the recent resurgence of interest in
ethics of virtue ... is the sense that the enterprise of articulating principles of right has failed."2 9 1 The advantage of virtue theory is that it

2 92
provides a noncynical response to this failure of codification.
Some critics will argue that fairness, courage, honesty, and prudence are concepts only slightly less abstract than the duty to "seek
justice." They will criticize my approach for substituting one set of

highly generalized standards for another.2 9 3 While I concede that the

key virtues I have identified might not lead a prosecutor to one right
decision in every situation, 29 4 they can help prosecutors filter out the
wrong reasons for acting. Thejoint talismen of fairness, courage, honesty, and prudence might serve as anchors to help prosecutors guard
against moral drift in their practice of law. Moreover, a renewed focus
on the virtues might promote a culture of thoughtful decisionmaking
in the prosecutorial community, thus providing individual prosecutors
with the intestinal fortitude necessary to resist both institutional pressures and the unscrupulous direction of other actors within the
system.
My focus on virtue leads me to three final recommendations and
one observation about professionalism within prosecutors' offices.
First, chief prosecutors and hiring managers should seek to hire
290 David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636, 644
(1983).
291 Watson, supra note 27, at 454.
292 Id. at 453-54.
293 My colleague Paul Tremblay has lamented the "slipperiness" of virtue ethics.
Tremblay, supra note 127, at 510. In the debate between virtuists and casuists, a casuist might claim that virtue ethics does not produce a concrete "answer" to moral dilemmas, and provides only "meager guidance" for practitioners confronting ethical
conflicts in real life situations. Id. at 510, 520. While I agree that virtue theory will
not always reveal to a conscientious moral actor one proper course of conduct, it
certainly helps to separate better decisions from worse ones. Even more significantly,
however, acting from a proper motive is ultimately more important for a virtue
ethicist than doing the so-called "right thing," assuming that there is ever one such a
result. Keenan, supra note 49, at 117. Finally, casuistry is not as concrete and definitive a form of ethical reasoning as its supporters might suggest. Not all actors are
equally capable of recognizing abstract principles in paradigm cases, and then applying these maxims to what they perceive are analogous situations. Tremblay, supra
note 127, at 517-19 (suggesting that such a method can provide for the resolution of
ethical dilemmas with "probablecertitude") (emphasis added). What virtue theory offers that casuistry does not is an explanation of how moral agents can better equip
themselves internally to make informed ethical choices. See supra notes 127-30 and
accompanying text,
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See supra note 110.
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young attorneys who either possess or have the capacity to develop the
virtues of courage, honesty, fairness, and prudence. This is not to say
that other attributes are not important to success as a prosecutorincluding, of course, intelligence, energy, and trial advocacy skills.
But these latter attributes are often given inordinate weight in the hiring process, to the detriment of the virtues, which may be viewed as
softer variables and thus more difficult to assess. Chief prosecutors
should ask questions during the interview process that attempt to
draw out a candidate's character,or what Philippa Foot refers to as the
"disposition of [one's] heart." 295 They can do so by asking hypothetical questions that are designed to test whether honesty, fairness and
prudence are qualities likely to be compromised by the lawyer in the
face of competing pressures. Hiring managers should also look for
experiences in the candidate's background that may have helped
shape his or her virtues during formative periods of the candidate's
life-such as leadership displayed on unpopular causes, service to the
poor and marginalized in society, a track record of being able to make
difficult decisions in complex situations, etc.
My second recommendation is directed at individual prosecutors
themselves, particularly at young prosecutors just beginning their careers. New prosecutors should be very careful about whom they pick
as role models in their offices. When young lawyers join a prosecutors' office they should seek guidance from more experienced lawyers
whom they believe exhibit the virtues of courage, fairness, honesty,
and prudence. Aristotle recognized that to understand the nature of
good judgment in political affairs we must identify those who have it,
watch what they do, and listen to what they have to say. 29 6 Good character comes from living in communities where virtue is encouraged
(families, churches, schools and, I would argue, some professional environments) and then modeling the behavior of others. 29 7 "[T3 here is
no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we
inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors ....298
2
When confronting difficult decisions in the course of
investigation or litigation of criminal cases, prosecutors should seek
advice from the lawyers in the office whosejudgment they respect and

295
296
297

Foot, supra note 109, at 108.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 11, at 186.
Shaffer, supra note 28, at 883; see STANLEY HA FRWAS, The Self as Sto"y, in VISION
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MAcINrnv

, supra note 29, at 127.

68, 76 (1974).
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or
who have the highest conviction rates
admire, not necessarily those
299
the greatest public stature.
in prosecutors' ofMy third recommendation is that managers
inexperienced attorneys in positions
fices should not place young and
and difficult discretionary deciwhere they need to make broad
that everyone does equally
sions. 30 0 Deliberation is not something
young are particularly handicapped
well. According to Aristotle, the
practical exof prudence due to their lack of
in exercising the virtue
30 1 Prosecutors' offices should thus be scrupulous
perience over time.
and when to promote them.
in their decisions of who to promote
"move" cases should not be the sole
Conviction rates and the ability to
Promotion should be granted
keys to advancement as a prosecutor.
a capacity for honesty, courage,
only after a lawyer has demonstrated
managers can identify these
fairness, and above all prudence. Senior
their labors; that is, their demonprosecutors through the fruits of
judgment in difficult situations.
strated capacity to exercise discerning
cautiously optimistic observaFinally, my analysis leads me to one
prosecutors. As elastic and amortion about the professional life of
may seem, it can be a source of
phous as the "seek justice" obligation
for virtuous prosecutors who
professional inspiration and satisfaction
asked the question whether a "Good
take it seriously. Abbe Smith has
and has concluded, rather proPerson [Can Be] a Good Prosecutor"
3 0 2 "It is especially difficult for prosecutors
vocatively, that he cannot.
pressure to adapt, conform, and
with ideals and ambition to resist the
' 30
to Smith, the temptation to win at
be part of the team. 3 According
at all costs mentality, is simply too
all costs, or at least to adopt a win
Criminal
Trial": When ProsecutorsKeep Score of
See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a
537, 546 (1996).
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
Article (strucethical questions addressed in this
hard
300 At least two of the three
assistance
ineffective
of
effects
the
and rectifying
turing deals to accomplice witnesses
cases
misdemeanor
than
rather
cases
in felony
of counsel) are more likely to arise
the
because
or municipal courts of this country,
routinely prosecuted in the district
more
defendant
the
to
and the consequences
factual allegations are more complex
the
dilemma (whether to impeach a witness
third
the
even
that
grave. I would argue
cases.
felony
tends to arise more in serious
prosecutor believes is testifying truthfully)
the prosecutor will have to detailed
access
greater
The more serious the case, the
and
299

the defendant,
police, reciprocal discovery from
investigative reports from the
a better position to
in
be
will
cases the prosecutor

grand jury testimony. In these
or not a deto cross-examination about whether
reach an informed judgment prior
fense witness is testifying truthfully.
supra note
VI, ch. 11, at 186; see also KroNMAN,
301 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk.
experience
of
lack
their
by
says, are handicapped
120, at 41 ("The young, [Aristotle]
life.").
than those who have seen more of
well
less
deliberate
whole
the
and on
302 Smith, supra note 13, at 378-79.
303 Id. at 396.
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of prosecutors working
great to be neutralized by the good intentions
disagree-not only because I
within the system. I must respectfully
good prosecutors, but also beknow many good people who are also
that it is possible to resist
cause I know from firsthand experience
prosecutors to cut corners,
many of the temptations brought upon
the public, and a daunting
including pressure from the police,
workload.
integrity might find more personal
The reality is that people of
in criminal prosecutions than in
satisfaction and sources of inspiration
third personal demands of cliadversarial roles where they must fulfill
his activities as consistent with first
ents. A lawyer who cannot defend
way in town and another way [at]
person values is forced to "'live one
argued that the commonly
home.' "3 04 Daniel Markovits has recently
is caused by exclusively roleobserved "crisis in the legal profession"
3
of ethics.
based solutions to the problems

05

The principal thesis of

system excuse"; that is, that
contemporary legal ethics is the "adversary
over his own, and therefore
a lawyer must prefer his client's interests
perceives as abhorrent or
must at times do things that he personally
3 06
immoral.
and first personal ethiBridging the gulf between third personal
than most lawyers, because 1)
cal ideals may be easier for prosecutors
live clients, and 2) they can imthey are not constrained by duties to
with their own values, thus
bue the open-ended "seekjustice" mandate
personal and professional lives.
avoiding harsh conflict between their
described the lawyerOver twenty years ago, Anthony Kronman
which is "capable of offerstatesmen role as "an ideal of character"
who view their professional
deep personal meaning to those
ing ...
30 7 While Kronman was pessimistic about
responsibilities in its light."
could be revived in light of the
whether the lawyer-statesmen ideal
trends toward specialization in
realities of modern law practice and
304

See Shaffer, supra note 28, at 879 (quoting

BIRD 267 (1960)).
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305 Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics
HusAN. 209, 290 (2003).
to jusa profession where lawyers are able
306 Id. at 211, 216. Markovits describes
parties,
third
to
duties
on
based
terms
impartial
tify their morally troubling actions in
happily
as components of a life [they] can
them
"cast
simultaneously
cannot
but they
personal
on
focus
greater
a
us to adopt
"[
endorse." Id. at 225. Markovits encourages
of legal ethics. Id. at 224. Elach
discussions
in
fulfillment
role
integrity rather than
them as
see
specifically with his own actions, to
person continues to need to identify
a
occupies
he
that
ambitions in light of the fact
contributing to his peculiar ethical
acown
his
to
respect
authorship-with
special position of intimacy and concern-of
Id.
plan."
tions and life
at 362.
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this construct of professionallegal education, he acknowledged that
of practice:
ism may continue to exist in pockets
this ideal in their own
Individuals, perhaps, may find a way to honor able to do so only
will be
careers. But increasingly, I fear, they
to the
in which a person devoted
by... searching out the cracks and crevices a living in the law.Y°8
still make
ideal of the lawyer-statesmen may

"crack[ ] or crevice[1"
Criminal prosecutions may be one such
without doing violence to their
where individuals can still practice law
to interpret the "seek juspersonal ideals, assuming they are willing
If they are to succeed,
tice" mandate as more than a mere platitude.
will be critical to promothowever, a renewed emphasis on the virtues
ing and preserving their moral integrity.
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Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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